



After a period of initial optimism, a dose of reality has set in for the
fervent supporters of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"). Many scholars
celebrated the arrival of the ICC as heralding an era of swifter and more
consistent enforcement of human rights and humanitarian law. To its most
enthusiastic proponents, the court was to be "the central pillar in the world
community for upholding fundamental dictates of humanity."'
The impracticality of these visions has become increasingly apparent.
Qualified support from many countries and a complete lack of support from
the United States has led to sharp limitations on the ICC's power.2 To a greater
degree than appreciated by commentators, the court will be effective only
when it acts as an institution complementary to national authorities. The
enforcement of international criminal law will remain heavily dependent on the
initiative and support of actors other than the ICC.
Contrary to much academic commentary, this Article argues that a less
centralized regime, and one that is less dominated by a powerful ICC, is not a
cause for despair-even for those who favor vigorous enforcement of
international criminal law. An isolated and dominant ICC may lack legitimacy
and have little direct impact on countries recovering from violent conflict.' A
less hierarchical international criminal justice system that relies significantly
on national governments is likely to be better informed by diverse
perspectives, more acceptable to local populations, and more effective in
accomplishing its ultimate goals.
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Antonio Cassese, From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the
International Criminal Court, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 18 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE ROME STATUTE]; see also
Robert Badinter, International Criminal Justice: From Darkness to Light, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE,
supra, at 1935 (praising the Court as a "new judicial dawn, devoted to the struggle against crimes
against humanity"); Klaus Kinkel, Der Internationale Strafsgerichtshof--ein Meilenstein in der
Entwicklung des Volkerrechts, 51 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2650 (1998). The Rome
Treaty, establishing the ICC, has itself been hailed as the "United Nations' most significant
accomplishment since its establishment in 1945." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Preface, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT XIX (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
2 See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89
passim (2003).
3 For a more detailed discussion of the question of the court's legitimacy, see discussion infra
Part I.
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Accepting these arguments need not lead to the view that the ICC
should be abandoned altogether, the approach favored by some commentators.'
The ICC can still play an important role in a less centralized regime. This
Article sets forth a vision of an ICC that focuses less on independent
prosecutions in The Hague and more on involvement of the ICC at the national
level. A key part of this vision is the participation of the ICC in mixed
tribunals that would be established in the state most directly affected by a
prosecution. As such, the model would be more closely related to the war
crimes tribunals recently established in Sierra Leone and East Timor than to
the international tribunals established for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
It would involve ICC judges and prosecutors working together with local
counterparts in a tribunal created in the territory where the crimes were
committed. In the event that prosecution in the affected country proves
impossible, mixed chambers could be set up in The Hague and include judges
nominated by the states of original jurisdiction. Finally, where the ICC can
garner no support for full prosecutions, it could hold public hearings to both
preserve evidence for an eventual trial and create international pressure on
noncooperating governments.
The widely positive reactions to existing mixed courts and the
proposals for setting up similar courts in Cambodia, Guatemala, and Iraq
suggest that the mixed-court model is politically viable.' In addition to its
political advantages, the hybrid-court model has a strong normative appeal. As
ICC judges and prosecutors deliberate with their local counterparts in joint
investigations and trials, they will render decisions that are better informed and
more responsive to the communities they most directly affect.' In a pluralist
world, reasoned deliberation across borders and across levels of government
offers the most legitimate, as well as the most durable, foundation for an
international legal regime.
The proposal to restructure the ICC as a roving mixed court is true to a
key principle underlying the ICC Statute-the principle of complementarity.
Complementarity provides that national jurisdictions take on the prosecution of
international crimes whenever they are willing and able to do so. By engaging
4 Charles Krauthammer, Our Real Friends in Europe, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 26, 2002,
LEXIS, News & Business Library, The Weekly Standard File; George Will, A Court for Chaos,
JEWISH WORLD REV., Jul. 10, 2002, at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/wil1071002.asp (last
visited Feb. 17, 2005).
5 See Samantha Power, Unpunishable, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 20, 2003, at 18; see also Seth
Mydans, Khmer Rouge Leaders Finally Will Face Tribunal, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 2004, at 6; U.N. Help
for Crime in Guatemala, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A28. The Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), created
to try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Baathist regime, will include non-
Iraqi jurists as advisors to the Iraqi judges and prosecutors. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art.
6(b). The IST Statute also permits the Iraqi Governing Council to appoint foreign judges to serve
alongside their Iraqi counterparts, id. art. 4(d), and the establishment of a mixed tribunal has been
proposed by various international organizations. E.g., Letter from Human Rights First to Ayad
Allawi, Prime Minister, Interim Government of Iraq (Aug. 11, 2004) (on file with author).
6 See discussion infra Part II; cf. Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of
International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (2003) (noting the importance of engaging
national authorities as a means of enhancing the legitimacy of human rights courts); Robert Howse &
Kalypso Nicola'idis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity? 16
GOVERNANCE 73 (2003) (discussing the value of engaging national authorities as a means of
enhancing the legitimacy of the WTO); Jenia lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89
VA. L. REV. 311, 339-43 (2003) (discussing the value of deliberation in producing more informed and
more legitimate decisions).
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national authorities in the establishment of mixed courts, the ICC could build a
true complementarity regime. It could empower national authorities to enforce
international criminal law even when they initially lack all the resources to do
so. It could encourage governments to participate in joint prosecutions with
the ICC, even where those governments might be unwilling to undertake
politically divisive prosecutions on their own or to surrender their nationals to
a distant court.
Part I of the Article describes the practical limitations on the ICC's
work and concludes that the duty of enforcing international criminal law will
continue to depend heavily on the action of national authorities. Part II
explains why a decentralized approach to enforcement is desirable on
theoretical and practical grounds. Part III proceeds to outline an appropriate
place for the ICC in a pluralist, decentralized international criminal justice
system. The argument will be that human rights would not suffer if the ICC's
operations in The Hague take on a less visible and dominant role. As this
Article argues throughout, a court that is less hierarchical and more agile
would better encourage broad enforcement of humanitarian and human rights
law. Although the impact of the court would be felt more slowly, it would be
more lasting.
I. A COURT OF LAST RESORT: PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ICC'S WORK
Many international law scholars and activists have high hopes for the
ICC as a tool for preventing and combating human rights violations. It is
doubtful, however, that the ICC will have the political capital to meet the
expectations of its more ardent supporters. Support for a powerful
international court has never been strong among those who have the ability to
make it so. The United States has withdrawn its support altogether, a position
that is unlikely to change any time in the near future. Several other major
powers have also resisted the idea of a strong court.
Support for a powerful court was relatively thin even during the
drafting of its founding statute. Qualified support from states resulted in a
statute with many compromises and restrictions on the court's powers. The
statute sharply limits the ICC's jurisdiction, and both the enforcement of the
court's orders and its financing are contingent on the goodwill of domestic
authorities. Even as the court begins its operations, its powers will remain
limited, and other tribunals will still carry out the majority of human rights
prosecutions.
A. Grand Visions Versus Political Reality: What the History of the Rome
Statute Tells Us About the ICC's Role in Human Rights Enforcement
Many scholars envision the ICC at the helm of global efforts to
develop and enforce human rights and humanitarian law.' They have high
7 E.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1991); Louis Ren6 Beres, After the Gulf War: Prosecuting Iraqi
Crimes Under the Rule of Law, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487 passim (1991); William N. Gianaris,
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hopes for the tribunal and expect it to advance international justice swiftly,
impartially, and effectively. The court is to "clarify existing ambiguities in the
law" and set the "highest international standards" of due process.8 It is to
provide prompt investigations and prosecutions of reported atrocities.9 Some
commentators even express the hope that the ICC would put an end to
impunity for grave human rights violations and deter war crimes around the
world.'" As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated, "[i]n the prospect of
an international criminal court lies the promise of universal justice. That is the
simple and soaring hope of this vision.""
To a degree not appreciated by many of the court's partisans, the
limited commitment by member states to the ICC will leave the court unable to
fulfill these grand expectations. The court is designed to function as an
institution secondary and complementary to national jurisdictions, and attempts
to redefine the court's role as a central enforcer of international criminal law
will continue to meet stiff resistance.
The idea of a permanent international criminal tribunal traces its
origins back to a convention drafted by the League of Nations in 1937. In the
wake of atrocities of World War I, the UN General Assembly passed a
resolution renewing the call for an international criminal court. For decades,
the idea expressed in these documents failed to gather sufficient support to
materialize. It was only with the end of the Cold War that an International
Criminal Court became politically feasible. A resurgence of ethnic violence
and transnational crimes such as drug trafficking and terrorism made the
project especially relevant. Overpowered by transborder drug crime, Latin
American countries sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly, calling
The New World Order and the Need for an International Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88,
91, 109-11 (1992-93); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal
Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381 passim (2000); INT'L LAW ASSOC'N (AMER.
BRANCH) COMM. ON A PERMANENT INT'L CRIM. CT., FIRST COMM. REPORT ON JURISDICTION,
DEFINITION OF CRIMES AND COMPLEMENTARITY (1996), 13 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 159
(1997) (Leila Sadat Wexler, Reporter). Those who have expressed reservations include Jos6 E.
Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 432-34
(1999); Goldsmith, supra note 2, passim; W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and
Other Massive Violations of Human Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 75; Richard
B. Bilder & Reed Brody, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 273 (2002) (book review); David Wippman,
Exaggerating the ICC (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8 See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Court: The Obstacles to
Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 294 (1998); see also Otto
Triffterer, Domesticos de ratificaci6n e implementaci6n, in LA NUEVA JUSTICIA PENAL
SUPRANACIONAL: DESARROLLOS POST-ROMA 13, 44, 45 (Kai Ambos ed., 2002) (expressing hope that
the ICC will clarify and advance international criminal law and will thus contribute to the
globalization of criminal justice).
9 Richard Goldstone, The United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment, 12 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 227, 238 (1997); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal
Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 712 (1996).
10 Mauro Politi, Introduction, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A
CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 8, 15 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001); Press Release, Statement
of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan Before the International Bar Association in New York (June 12,
1997), U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6257 (1997), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19970612.sgsm6257.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
Press Release, supra note 10.
12 G.A. Res. 260B, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt.1, at 177, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need To Establish a Permanent
International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 52 (1997).
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for an international criminal court to deal with such crimes more effectively.'3
After more countries expressed an interest in the proposal, the UN General
Assembly set in motion a process for drafting a statute for the court. 4  At a
Diplomatic Conference in Rome in 1998, delegates from more than 150
countries and 175 nongovernmental organizations gathered to discuss and
agree on the final version of the proposed statute.'" After five weeks of intense
negotiations, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted
by a vote of 120-to-7, with twenty-one countries abstaining.'6
The large number of delegations that voted for the Statute is seen by
many as an indication of the overwhelming support for the court-especially in
light of the speedy ratifications of the Statute, currently standing at ninety-
seven.'" Often missed in the story of the court's creation is that a majority of
the participating states were reluctant to endorse a strong court. Throughout
the drafting process, many state delegates expressed a strong preference for
domestic prosecutions and insisted that international trials remain a last resort
option.'8 The final version of the Statute largely reflects those preferences.
The initial proposal for the ICC itself envisioned not an active
supranational body, but a supporting institution that would come to the aid of
countries that find themselves unable to deal with transnational crime. 9
Debates about the jurisdiction of the court and its relationship to national
judiciaries also suggest that the majority of negotiating states did not favor a
13 The delegation of Trinidad and Tobago was the moving force behind these efforts. See
Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Forty-Fourth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/44/195 (1989); see also International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities
Engaged in Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs Across National Frontiers and Other Transnational
Criminal Activities Establishment of an International Criminal Court with Jurisdiction Over Such
Crimes, Report of the Sixth Committee to the General Assembly, Agenda Item 152, U.N. Doc.
A/44/770 (1989) [hereinafter Agenda Item 152].
4G.A. Res. 44/39, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 310, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989);
G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/53 (1994); G.A. Res.
46, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc A/Res/50/46 (1995).
15 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 211, 235 (2002); Alessandra Stanley,
Conference Opens on Creating Court To Try War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at Al.
16 Sadat & Carden, supra note 7, at 384.
17 International Criminal Court, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html (last visited October
31, 2004); see also Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implications for Domestic
Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215, 216 (2002) (noting that the speedy
ratifications "surpassed nearly everyone's hopes" and represent "a remarkable and rapid development
in international law").
18 Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE,
supra note 1, at 583, 585; Intervention de M. Boualem Bouguetaia, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres,
Algerie, Statement Before the Plenipotentiaries Conference of the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court (June 16, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005); Dilip
Lahiri, Head of Delegation of India, Explanation of Vote on the Adoption of the International
Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005); H.E.
Mr. Muladi, Minister for Justice, Head of Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, Statement Before
the Plenipotentiaries Conference of the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (June 16,
1998), at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005); Judge Eli Nathan, Head of
Delegation of Israel, Statement on the Adoption of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), at
http://www.un.org/icc/index.htin (last visited Jan. 12, 2005); cf Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 29-51,
U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report] (revealing that these
preferences were also expressed at the preliminary drafting stage).
19 Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Forty-Fourth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/44/195 (1989); see also Agenda Item 152, supra note 13.
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powerful international criminal court, but were concerned about retaining the
power to prosecute crimes committed on their territory or by their own
nationals."
A reflection of these sovereignty concerns is the principle of
complementarity, a key feature of the ICC Statute. This principle provides that
the court can accept cases only where national authorities are unwilling or
unable to handle them.' The ICC's role as an institution complementary to
domestic courts proved to be so fundamental to the court's purpose that States
Parties included three references to it in the Rome Statute-in the Preamble,
Article 1, and Article 17.22
Even as complementarity was entrenched in the Statute, however, the
court was given the ultimate power to decide whether a country is "unwilling"
or "unable" to prosecute a case. 3 Many states expressed concerns, both before
and during the Rome Conference, about the intrusion into national affairs that
might result from this arrangement. China and the United States urged that
admissibility determinations be made by domestic courts or possibly the
Security Council, 5 or at a minimum, that the ICC have only limited discretion
to assert jurisdiction over a state's objection.26 Even as a fragile consensus
developed about the ICC's power to decide admissibility, state delegates
repeatedly emphasized that the ICC should admit only extraordinary cases,
where the national forum refuses to undertake the prosecution of war crimes in
20 Kaul, supra note 18, at 585 (noting that states other than those in the "like-minded group,"
which included about 60 states, either wanted a weak ICC or, in the case of Security Council
members, an ICC controlled by the Security Council). India, Mexico, Indonesia, and Japan were
among the more vocal advocates of a narrower jurisdiction for the ICC. Id.
21 Complementarity will be administered in practice through ICC decisions on the admissibility
of cases, so the terms admissibility and complementarity are oftem used interchangeably. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjoumal/RomeStatute_120704-EN.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). It is
worth noting that complementarity applies even when the UN Security Council refers a case to the
ICC. Id. at art. 13(6).
22 Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery To Implement
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 897 (2002). The duplication of the
complementarity provision was not legally necessary, but rather reflected states' desire to ensure that
international jurisdiction would not undermine state sovereignty. Id.
23 ICC Statute art. 17(l)(a).
24 Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference, in 1 THE
ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 67, 69; Comments of the United States to the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.244/l/add.2 (1995) [hereinafter Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee] (noting that the draft
statute "frequently fails to uphold" national jurisdiction); Statement of H. Owada (Japan) to U.N.G.A.
6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.25 (1995) (urging principal
reliance upon national courts pursuant to the principle of "prosecute or extradite" and pointing out that
"[s]addling the international criminal court with an unrealistically ambitious role would riskjeopardizing both the universal accession of States to the statute and the court's effectiveness");
Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 13-14, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/50/SR.25 (1995) ("The international criminal court should not supplant national courts, nor
should it become a supranational court or act as an appeal court for national court judgments. Any
proposal aimed at making it a supranational judicial body would violate the principle of
complementarity .... Regrettably, [the complementarity principle] has not been fully implemented in
the operative part [of the ICC Statute], where some provisions even seemed to contradict it.")
25 See Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., supra note 24, at 14.
26 Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 24, at 12-14, 23-26.
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good faith.2 The refrain of sovereignty concerns expressed in the debates
suggested that aggressive use of the ICC's power to determine the
admissibility of cases would meet with resistance.28
Debates at the Rome Conference reflected a cautious and restrained
approach with respect not only to admissibility of cases, but also to the scope
of ICC jurisdiction.29  As a result of this ambivalence, the Statute does not
provide for universal jurisdiction, meaning that the court would not have the
power to prosecute war criminals who only temporarily find themselves on the
territory of a state party. This exclusion was made despite active lobbying by
human rights activists who pointed out that it gives a free pass to "traveling
tyrants."3  Subject matter jurisdiction is also limited to the most serious
international crimes-genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes-
despite strong voices for a more expansive list of covered offenses.' And
although the jurisdiction of the court now covers crimes committed during both
international and internal armed conflict, the provision on internal armed
conflict was adopted over strong objections by, among others, the Arab League
states, China, and India. 2
Even as states ceded some of their penal powers to the ICC in Rome,
they refused to relinquish important sovereign prerogatives in administering
criminal justice. As a consequence, the statute lacks provisions on amnesties,
pardons, parole, and sentence commutations. Various delegations argued "that
the [s]tatute should not permit the court to intercede in the administrative
(parole) or political decisionmaking process (pardons, amnesties) of a State."33
As a result of this compromise, it is now arguably possible for a state to
convict, but then pardon an accused war criminal, without prompting ICC
action.
Finally, states were also reluctant to grant the court power in the area
of enforcement. The court depends almost entirely on the cooperation of
domestic authorities to collect evidence and arrest suspects, yet it cannot
directly sanction noncooperation. As some commentators have noted, the
27 Jeffrey L. Bleich, The International Criminal Court: Report of the ILA Working Group on
Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 281, 286 (1997); see also id. (citing ICC Committee
Report at 9, par. 43, which notes that States have "stressed that the standards [for determining
"availability" and "effectiveness"] were not intended to allow the international criminal court to pass
judgement on the operation of national courts in general").
28 A recent report commissioned by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor indicates some sensitivity
to this issue. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, THE PRINCIPLE OF
COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE 8 (2003) (recognizing that "[it was extremely important to many
States that proceedings cannot be found 'non-genuine' simply because of a comparable lack of
resources or because of a lack of full compliance with all human rights standards").
29 Kaul, supra note 18, at 585.
30 Sadat & Carden, supra note 7, at 414; see also Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 92 ("The most
salient class of human rights violators during the past century has been oppressive leaders who abuse
their own people within national borders. Under the traveling dictator exception, the ICC does not
touch this class of offenders, even if they travel abroad.")
31 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 18, at 11; Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 24, at
69.
32 Bilder & Brody, supra note 7, at 269.
33 El Zeidy, supra note 22, at 941.
34 ICC Statute art. 87(7) (providing that the Court must refer findings of noncooperation to the
Assembly of States Parties, or, where the Security Council referred the case, to the Security Council).
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
section on state cooperation with the ICC "suggests that while States agree to
the establishment of the [c]ourt in principle, and even to its jurisdiction in
theory, they are not willing to make the concessions to international
cooperation that are needed to make the [c]ourt a success in practice.""
The negotiations were not the only stage at which states expressed
reservations about a powerful, wide-reaching ICC. After the Rome Treaty won
approval by an overwhelming majority and the ICC seemed a closer reality,
sovereignty concerns persisted in many states. As the Rome Treaty came up
for a vote of ratification in national legislatures, reluctant policymakers needed
assurances that ratification would not result in their country's relinquishing
control over the prosecution of their fellow citizens.36
One such assurance has been the passage of domestic legislation that
criminalizes offenses within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC.
Although the Rome Statute imposes no explicit duty on States Parties to pass
such legislation,37 the complementarity provisions of the Statute have prodded
signatory countries to incorporate prohibitions on genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity into their criminal statutes. 8 By adopting the relevant
35 Sadat & Carden, supra note 7, at 444.
36 Asian countries have been particularly reluctant to ratify the ICC Treaty. E.g., Benjamin
Goold, Ratifying the Rome Statute: Japan and the International Criminal Court, ASIA-PACIFIC NEWS,
Sept. 2002, at http://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-pacific/no_29/05japanandicc.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2005) (noting the continuing concerns of Japan, an active participant in the Rome Conference, that the
ICC might undermine Japanese sovereignty); The Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, European Commissioner for
External Relations, Speech at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament (Sept. 25, 2002), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/news/patten/spO2_431.htm (noting a ratification "gap
among Asian states"); Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center, Asian Campaign on the Rome
Statute Ratification, ASIA-PACIFiC NEWS, Mar. 2002 at http://www.hurights.or.jp/asia-
pacific/no_27/02romastatute.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). For evidence from other countries, see
HELEN DURHAM, AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2004), at
http://www.redcross.org.au/newsroom featurestories iccbackground.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005);
Letter from Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director, Americas Division, Human Rights Watch to
Senador Sadot Sdnchez Carreflo, President, Mexican Human Rights Commission (May 21, 2002), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/mexico-icc-ltr.htm (expressing concern about Mexico's lack of
progress toward ratification and noting that "Mexico is certainly not alone in finding that the
ratification of the ICC raises serious juridical questions regarding state sovereignty .... ") (last visited
Jan. 15, 2005); Senado congelo estudio de Tribunal Penal Internacional, EL MOSTRADOR, Apr. 9,
2002 (Peru). But see Roy S. Lee, An Assessment of the ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750, 750
(2002) (noting the increased goodwill toward the ICC project after the Rome Treaty was signed).
37 Parties have a duty to adapt their domestic laws to implement the cooperation obligations
under Part 9 of the Statute. Alain Pellet, Entry into Force and Amendment of the Statute, in THE
ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 145, 152. But states are not under a legal obligation to implement
other basic provisions of the Statute. Id. at 153; see also Bruce Broomhall, La Cour Penale
Internationale: Directives pour l'adoption des lois nationales d'adaptation, 13 NOUVELLES ETUDES
PENALES 122 (1999) (stating that there is no explicit obligation under the Rome Statute on States
Parties to prohibit in their national law the crimes falling within the Court's competence).
38 Amnesty International, Implementation, at
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/int-jus-iccnimplementation (last visited Nov. 15, 2004)
(listing twenty-eight countries that have enacted implementing legislation and eleven that have drafted
such legislation); Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Draft Report: ECOWAS-ICRC
Seminar on the Ratification and Implementation of the ICC Statute, 29-31 January 2002, at
http://www.iccnow.org/conferencesmeetings/reportsdeclarations/africareports/2002/AbidjanReportEC
OWASFeb02.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) (noting that Ghana and Senegal are in the process of
passing implementing legislation prohibiting offenses proscribed by the Rome Statute and
encouraging other ECOWAS members to do the same); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE STATUS OF
ICC IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION (noting that Argentina, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Niger, and Senegal have begun the implementation process), at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-implementation.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005); Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Implementing the Rome Statute, at
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implementing legislation, countries are ensuring that the !CC will not find
them "unable" to prosecute international crimes and thus will not interfere with
their control over war crimes cases."
The threat of international prosecutions had a similar effect on the
German government after World War I. Faced with the threat that the Allies
would try alleged German war criminals in special international military
tribunals, Germany "passed new legislation and assumed jurisdiction in order
to be able to prosecute the selected offenders under national law. '40 By
contrast, the duty to enact implementing legislation under the 1949 Geneva
Conventions went largely unheeded,4 '1 because no international tribunal existed
that would assume jurisdiction where nation-states failed to do so. The rapid
passage of implementing legislation is an indicator of the influence the ICC is
already exerting on domestic judicial processes, a topic discussed further in
Part III. At the same time, it confirms the determination of domestic
authorities around the world to retain control over the prosecution of their
nationals.
B. U.S. Resistance to the ICC
The qualified support for the ICC from various participating states
might not be a great obstacle to the flourishing of the court if the court had the
backing of the United States. Nevertheless, the United States has strongly
opposed the idea of a powerful ICC.
The U.S. government was an active participant in the initial stages of
the drafting of the ICC Statute."2 Dissatisfied with the final version, the United
States withdrew its support from the ICC, and the American delegate voted
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign__policy/icc/implementing-icc-en.asp (last updated Feb. 17, 2003)
(providing links to the implementing legislation of ten countries).
39 E.g., Goold, supra note 36, at 1 ("Because Japanese law does not currently provide for
domestic prosecution for war crimes, there is concern within the government that should
a... Japanese citizen be accused of such crimes, Japan would be obliged to hand that individual over
to the ICC for indictment. Given that this is a situation the Japanese government is keen to avoid, the
passing of emergency legislation is regarded as an essential precursor to ratification of the Rome
Statute and participation in the ICC."); Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center, Asian
Campaign on the Rome Statute Ratification, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that the "ratification of the
Rome Statute by countries in Asia will certainly hinge on the way domestic laws are linked to the
provisions of the treaty"); HELEN DURHAM, AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 36 ("The ICC will not impact upon national sovereignty as Australia will have
fully formed domestic legislation to allow the prosecution of our own people within this country.").
See generally International Human Rights Law Institute, Progress Report on the Ratification and
National Implementing Legislation of the Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, DePaul University (7th ed. 2001); INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT & THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MANUAL FOR THE RATIFICATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROME STATUTE (2000), at http://www.dd-
rd.ca/frame2.iphtml?langue=0 (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
40 El Zeidy, supra note 22, at 872.
41 Dietrich Schindler, Book Review, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 158, 160 (1998) (noting that "it must be
assumed that only a few states have fully complied with these obligations").
42 Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the International
Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 383 (2002).
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against it. 3 Before he left office, however, President Bill Clinton reconsidered
the decision to oppose the court and signed the Rome Treaty. He reasoned that
as a member of the ICC, the United States would be better able to influence its
development. Nonetheless, he was concerned about the "significant flaws"
remaining in the court's statute."
Under the Bush administration, U.S. resistance to the ICC project has
intensified. Arguing that the ICC Statute conflicts with rights guaranteed to
American citizens by the Constitution, some members of Congress introduced
legislation to prohibit cooperation with the court. 5 Moved by these arguments
and by concerns that the ICC may be used to prosecute American military
personnel for political purposes, in 2002 the Bush Administration sent a letter
to the UN Secretary-General stating that the United States "does not intend to
become a party" to the Rome Treaty and "has no legal obligations arising from
its signature on December 31, 2000."' In August 2002, President Bush signed
the legislation prohibiting U.S. cooperation with the ICC. 7  Since then, the
Administration has negotiated numerous bilateral agreements with states that
are parties to the statute, to the effect that they would not surrender American
citizens to the ICC.4
8
Because of the sharp disagreement between Europe and the United
States on the reach of the ICC, the court has become a symbol of Europe's
efforts to assert itself internationally and to constrain American power. This
may have had the effect of unifying Europe behind the court while hardening
U.S. opposition to it. The court itself is a likely casualty of this growing divide
between Europe and the United States.
While the United States has been the most vocal opponent, other major
powers have also resisted the idea of a powerful ICC. China and India were
among the countries that voted against the Rome Treaty, and Russia has
refused to ratify it.49  During the negotiations, these countries insisted on a
strong regime of complementarity, and Russia, China, France, and the United
States (four of the five permanent Security Council members) pushed for
Security Council control over the court, both in referring and blocking cases
43 There were six key objections: First, the statute included a provision for jurisdiction over
nationals of nonparty states; second, it included a prosecutor with the power to initiate investigations
on her own authority; third, the Statute did not include a provision for a ten-year opt-out period from
the court's jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity; fourth, the statute included the
crime of aggression; fifth, it incorporated a resolution proposing that terrorism and drug crimes be
brought within the court's jurisdiction in the future; and finally, it prohibited reservations. See Sean D.
Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: State Department
Views on the Future for War Crimes Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INTL. L. 482, 484 (2002).
" Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Signs Treaty for World Court To Try Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2001, at Al.
45 Amann & Sellers, supra note 42, at 383.
46 Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security, United States, to Kofi Annan, Secretary General, United Nations (May 6, 2002),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
47 James Podgers, Quest for Credibility: International Criminal Court Faces Startup Challenges,
88 A.B.A. J. 16, 18 (Nov. 2002).
48 Id. at 18.
49 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISHIbible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treatyl .asp (last
visited Nov. 30, 2004).
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going to the court.0 Finally, Israel, Arab states, and sub-Saharan African
states, where many of the serious conflicts are occurring, were also reluctant to
accept various provisions of the Rome Statute and have consequently failed to
sign or ratify it."
C. The Result of Limited Support: A Weaker Court
No international institution with political capital as limited as that of
the ICC is likely to be powerful. The court is particularly vulnerable because it
relies heavily on the goodwill of domestic authorities to enforce its mandates.
Its weak capacity to command cooperation from states will undermine its
work.52
The ICC has no police force, so it depends on other states, particularly
those with powerful militaries, to arrest suspects and enforce its judgments.
Furthermore, the ICC prosecutor lacks subpoena powers and cannot collect
evidence (e.g., compel witnesses, conduct exhumations, or seize bank accounts
and government documents) without the cooperation of domestic authorities. 3
In addition, the ICC cannot sanction states directly for failure to comply with
its orders; rather, it has to refer its findings of noncompliance to the Assembly
of States Parties or the Security Council.54
The uneven record of states' cooperation with international tribunals
does not bode well for the court's ability to attract the cooperation of domestic
authorities. The ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda ("ICTR") and the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") often saw their requests for cooperation and even their
orders go unheeded. The Yugoslav government for a long time refused to
surrender war criminals to The Hague, and the eventual transfer of Slobodan
Milosevic to the ICTY resulted in massive protests and divisions within the
country." Even after the transfer of Milosevic, despite economic and political
pressure from the West, the Yugoslav government refrained from recognizing
the ICTY's legal status and denied it access to archives and documents.56
Rwanda has similarly refused to cooperate with the ICTR on occasion. In
1999, it suspended cooperation with the Tribunal in protest against the
Tribunal's release from custody-on procedural grounds---of a high-level
suspect.57 More recently, the overwhelmingly Tutsi Rwandan government
50 ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 348; Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 24, at 71.
51 See Wippman, supra note 7, at *4.
52 Sadat & Carden, supra note 7, at 415.
53 ICC Statute art. 87; Sadat & Carden, supra note 7, at 416.
54 Where a State Party refuses to cooperate with the court, the court may "refer the matter to the
Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the
Security Council." ICC Statute art. 87(7).
55 Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 94; Daniel Simpson, Milosevic Trial Leaves Most Serbs Cynical,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at A8.
56 Carlotta Gall, Hague Tribunal Chief Says Yugoslavia Still Isn't Cooperating, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2001, at A8.
57 ICTR prosecutors had violated his rights to speedy trial by detaining him without trial for over
one year. Emmanuel Goujon, Rwanda Suspends Cooperation With Genocide Court Over Release,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, Nov. 06, 1999, WESTLAW NewsRoom Library, 11/6/99
Agence Fr.-Presse File.
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again failed to respond to requests for cooperation from the ICTR when the
Tribunal began investigations into crimes committed by the Tutsi Rwandan
Patriotic Front.58
Lack of cooperation has extended beyond states whose nationals were
being tried by international tribunals. Countries neighboring Rwanda have
harbored fugitive war criminals,59 and countries whose peacekeeping forces
were on the ground in Rwanda and Yugoslavia have been reluctant to send
their nationals to testify before the tribunals: Peacekeeping states were
reluctant to order their forces to capture war criminals that were still at large.
Importantly, although the ICTR and ICTY have jurisdictional primacy over
domestic authorities, the Security Council has failed to sanction domestic
authorities that refused to cooperate with the international tribunals.62
Many of the successes of the tribunals came as a result of U.S.
pressure on uncooperative governments. American support was central to the
arrest and surrender of suspects in the former Yugoslavia. Through sustained
diplomatic, military, and financial pressure, the United States undermined
Milosevic's regime in Yugoslavia, paving the way for the arrests and trials of
Serb war criminals. 3 In particular, the United States's threat to withhold U.S.
and International Monetary Fund aid to the successor regime in Yugoslavia
prompted Milosevic's transfer to the ICTY6' American diplomatic pressure
also compelled the Croatian government to cooperate with the ICTY 5
Without question, the lack of political, financial, and military support from the
United States will be a significant constraint on the ICC's ability to function
effectively.
The lack of enthusiasm for a powerful ICC might also affect the
court's financing. Under the final version of the ICC Statute, the ICC will be
financed mainly by contributions from member states (general UN funds are
also likely to be used, but primarily for cases referred by the Security
Council).66 The support of more affluent states will be essential for the court to
58 UN Prosecutor Rallies UK Support To Investigate Rwandan Army, AFRICA NEWS, Dec. 3,
2002, LEXIS, News & Business Library, Africa News File.
59 Goldstone, supra note 9, at 236 (noting that some African countries "were reluctant to
cooperate in the arrest and transfer of indictees to the Rwanda tribunal"); ICTR Worries About
Hindering Arrest of Rwandan Genocide Suspects, XINHUA, Dec. 14, 2000, LEXIS, News & Business
Library, Xinhua General News Service File (citing the ICTR Prosecutor as saying that the arrests of
some indicted individuals are being hampered by two African countries).
60 Remy Ourdan, La laborieuse invention d'une justice internationale, LE MONDE, June 18,
1998, LEXIS, News & Business Library, Le Monde (FR) File. The United States imposed conditions
on the way the testimony of its diplomats would be taken. Christopher Marquis, U.S. Seeks
Safeguards on Diplomats Testifying on Milosevic Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at A13.
61 ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES 252 (1997); Ourdan, supra note 60.
62 Bartram Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 433 (1998) (noting that the
Security Council proved reluctant "to take stronger action to arrest indictees and to sanction states that
fail[ed] or refuse[d] to cooperate with the ICTY").
63 Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 93.
64 Id.
65 Chris Hedges, Zagreb Sends Croat to Trial in the Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, at Al1;
Chris Hedges, 10 Bosnian Croats Surrender to War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at
A3.
66 ICC Statute art. 115. The Court could also utilize "additional funds" provided voluntarily by
governments, international organizations, individuals, and corporations, but given the controversial
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function effectively. Because of its substantial dependence on states'
contributions, the ICC could be seriously undermined if a major contributor
should withdraw its funding. Consider the examples of the Committee against
Torture and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:
"While both were initially meant to be state-supported, states' failure to pay
their dues eventually led to financing from the regular UN budget" and thus to
underfunding. International tribunals are considerably more expensive than
regular UN agencies," and as officials from the ICTR and ICTY have testified,
the lack of funds can seriously impede their work. 9 The ICC could be
similarly crippled without the support of the United States.7"
D. The Result of a Weaker Court: Multiple Sites of Interpretation and
Enforcement
The inescapable fact of the ICC's limited political capital means that
other institutions will retain a vital role in interpreting and enforcing human
rights and humanitarian law. Essentially, four broad possibilities exist for the
implementation of international criminal law in the absence of a strong ICC.
First, the UN could create more ad hoc international tribunals based in
The Hague or another neutral location, like those established for Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia. This solution, however, would seem to defeat the
entire purpose of the ICC. Although the Bush administration has expressed
some support for this option," the UN administration and most members do not
favor it. Given the current political landscape, the ICC will have limited
powers, but it will not disappear altogether. As long as it exists, it will seem
peculiar to create new ad hoc international tribunals that perform the same
function as an already existing bureaucracy."
Second, national courts could continue to prosecute crimes committed
on their territory or by their nationals. These trials could arise under either
international law or domestic human rights and war crimes statutes. Although
nature of this provision, it is still unclear how and to what extent such funds will be used. ICC Statute
art. 116.
67 Pejic, supra note 8, at 328 (citing Codification Division of the UN Office of Legal Affairs,
Possible Types of Relationship Between the United Nations and a Permanent International Criminal
Court 6-7 (Background Paper 1997)).
68 The ICTY's and ICTR's budgets for 2002-03 were about $223 million and $177 million,
respectively, and the ICC is projected to cost between $25 and $40 million in its initial years. Carola
Hoyos & Nikki Tait, A Tough Case: The International Criminal Court Becomes a Reality Today. But
with Strong U.S. Opposition and Concerns About Funding, It Is in for a Difficult Future, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2002, at 18.
69 Graham T. Blewitt, International and National Prosecutions, in REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 155, 155-56
(Christopher C. Joyner & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1998).
70 Hoyos & Tait, supra note 68, at 18 (citing skeptical remarks by the U.S. Ambassador for War
Crimes concerning the financing of the court).
71 The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice or Show of
Justice?: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 20, 25 (2002) (statement
of Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of State).
72 As this Article argues in Part II, international tribunals, because of their remoteness from the
country where the crime was committed, may also have less legitimacy and less impact on domestic
efforts to promote reconciliation and rule of law.
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some national courts have been lagging in their obligation to prosecute gross
human rights violations, others have vigorously pursued such trials. Compared
to international prosecutions, local trials are more efficient and rarely
encounter serious enforcement problems.73 At the same time, political pressure
on local judges or a serious lack of resources can lead to unfair results.
Countries with no connection to the underlying offenses could also
take up cases under "universal jurisdiction." Several European countries, with
Belgium at the forefront, have passed laws granting their courts jurisdiction
over specific international crimes regardless of where they occur or what the
nationality of the victim or the offender may be. ' The universal jurisdiction
approach is, however, even more problematic than the ICC. States are less
likely to cede prosecutorial authority to the domestic courts of other states
acting under universal jurisdiction than to the ICC, an organization that at least
requires the consent of a state with a link to the offense. Moreover, the basis
for universal jurisdiction remains highly contested. In the recent International
Court of Justice's Arrest Warrant decision, several judges expressed
disapproval of Belgium's law providing for prosecution of international crimes
under universal jurisdiction and in absentia.75 More recently, the United States
threatened to move NATO headquarters out of Brussels unless Belgium
amended its universal jurisdiction statute-which Belgium promptly did in
response to the pressure. 76
Finally, mixed courts, composed of international and national judges,
could prosecute international crimes in the territory where those crimes
occurred. Such courts have already been created in Sierra Leone, East Timor,
and Kosovo, and have been proposed for Cambodia, Iraq, and Guatemala.7
They have been generally well received by the UN and the countries affected
by the crime, as well as by the United States. As Part III argues, they could
serve as a model for recreating the mandate of the ICC. Instead of creating
such courts on an ad hoc basis, however, the international community can
more efficiently organize them under the aegis of the ICC.' A system of
73 National courts may encounter enforcement problems, however, when an accused is out of
their jurisdictional reach. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
74 Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and the Prosecution of War Crimes, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE
AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 393, 400-01 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-
Goldman eds., 2000).
75 The case did not directly address the challenge to universal jurisdiction, but instead found that
the subject of the arrest warrant, the former foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
was entitled to immunity from prosecution in Belgium. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Democratic Rep. of the Congo v. BeIg.), 41 I.L.M. 536. (Feb. 14, 2002). Compare id. at 562,
para. 12 (separate Opinion of Pres. Guillaume) (rejecting the existence of universal jurisdiction in
absentia), with id. 583 para. 45, 586 para. 59 (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal) (noting that no established state practice of exercising universal jurisdiction exists, but
that a state may be able to exercise universal jurisdiction lawfully if it first offers "to the national State
of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges concerned").
76 See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888,
889-91 (2003).
77 For a general discussion of mixed courts and their advantages, see Laura Dickinson, The
Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003).
78 See infra notes 237-238 and accompanying text regarding other advantages of ICC-backed
mixed courts over ad hoc mixed courts.
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mixed courts, with the ICC serving as a coordinating and circuit-riding body of
experts and jurists, may be the best hope for international criminal law.
Whatever shape international justice takes and whatever role the ICC
assumes in promoting it (a topic to which I return in Part III), the court must
come to terms with the central role that national institutions will continue to
play.
II. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH A CENTRALIZED REGIME
OF ENFORCEMENT
For many who believe in vigorous enforcement of international
criminal law, a less powerful ICC is a cause for disappointment. It should not
be. Advancement of international criminal law through a single, centralized
institution presents both theoretical and practical problems. It is less likely to
result in informed and politically acceptable interpretations of international
criminal law. It will also contribute little to the process of reconciliation and
judicial reconstruction in the countries affected by international crimes.
A. The Centralized Model of the ICC
To understand the arguments in favor of a limited role for the ICC, it is
necessary first to examine the policy arguments in favor of a powerful court.
Advocates of a strong ICC argue that centralization leads to a more coherent
jurisprudence and more effective enforcement of humanitarian and human
rights law. Many of them have disfavored a strong complementarity regime,
fearing that leaving the task of enforcement to national courts would result in
failure to prosecute war crimes.79 Proponents of a powerful ICC have argued
that "the rendering of justice is too important to be left to the whims of
governments that are prone to compromise either on enforcing the law against
perpetrators or on guaranteeing them due process."'8
Even where national courts might be able to take on war crimes
prosecutions, some international law scholars maintain that international fora
more readily fulfill victims' "expectation[s] for the highest form of justice"8
and are better at upholding the "rule of international law."82 The international
justice system, these scholars maintain, can count on the expertise of jurists
who are better qualified, more impartial than judges "caught up in the milieu
which is the subject of the trials," and better equipped to render uniform
79 Some have lamented the omission of universal jurisdiction. See Luigi Condorelli, La Cour
Penale Internationale: Un Pas de Geant, 103 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
7, 16-17 (1999) (criticizing the ICC's incomplete jurisdictional system for lagging behind the current
international law). Others have argued that the absence of a provision declaring void national
amnesties is problematic. See Christine Van den Wyngaert & Tom Ongena, Ne Bis in Idem Principle,
Including the Issue ofAmnesty, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 705, 728.
80 Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1998),
cited in Alvarez, supra note 7, at 375.
81 Goldstone, supra note 9, at 238.
82 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of
Breaches ofInternational Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 8 (1998).
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justice." Because international tribunals are more likely than local courts to be
impartial, they are also more able to build "objective" records of events. '
In addition to these functional advantages, the ICC is said to have an
important symbolic, norm-reinforcing value.85 By articulating and solidifying
international norms relating to armed conflict and human rights, the court
conveys "the sense that there is a regulation of the international realm, a
legitimate international law, and an international law with shared threshold
norms."8 Some commentators have speculated that, by sending a message that
the international community will not tolerate certain behavior, a permanent
international criminal court would also serve a deterrent function.87 Finally, by
articulating a coherent set of rules and principles, the ICC would provide a
template for national authorities contemplating war crimes prosecutions. Over
the long run, the court's rulings would be accepted by national communities
and incorporated into domestic law.88
The aspirations of this centralized model of enforcement are
universalist. The ICC is expected to advance a body of law uniformly
applicable around the globe and wholly independent from the context in which
its subjects are situated. 9 To achieve the coherence and broad universality
required by this conception of international law, the court's judgments must
take precedence over diverse local interpretations of humanitarian law and
human rights principles. The top-down model views variation in interpretation
and enforcement at the national level with skepticism. Decentralization is
83 STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-23, 184 (2001); Cassese, supra note 80, at 5, 8 (noting that
in comparison to national courts, international courts are less destabilizing to fragile governments and
less likely to cede to "short-term objectives of national politics").
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4161th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4161 (2000) (statement of Judge
Claude Jorda); Cassese, supra note 82, at 9-10.
85 U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4063rd mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4063 (1999) (statement of Mr.
Fowler, Canada); Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias ofInternational Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 237, 253 (1998) (observing that "rendering a human rights abuse an international crime
serves... a symbolic [purpose], as a statement of international concern about the severity of the act").
86 See Ruti Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 355, 387 (2002). Geoffrey Robertson identifies in similar terms one of the greatest contributions
of the Nuremberg judgment: "[The crimes committed by the Nazis] were not.., crimes against
Germans (which therefore only Germans should punish); they were crimes against humanity, because
the very fact that a fellow human being could conceive and commit them diminishes every member of
the human race." ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 220.
87 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3119 (1992) (statement of Mr.
Perkins, United States); UN Rights Chief ICRC Welcome ICC But Urge More Members, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 11, 2003, WESTLAW NewsRoom Library, 3/11/03 Agence Fr.-Presse File
(citing both the UN high commissioner for human rights and the ICRC for proposition that ICC will
deter war criminals); see also Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former
Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 812-14 (1999) (noting the deterrent function of international
criminal tribunals).
88 Investigations, prosecutions, and civil cases initiated at the national level (albeit in third
countries) were undoubtedly influenced by the work of the ICTY and ICTR. E.g., Marlise Simons,
Pinochet's Spanish Pursuer: Magistrate of Explosive Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at Al (noting
that the investigating judge who brought charges in Spain against Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet
was indebted to the work of the ICTY and ICTR).
89 The universalist model is part of a larger movement toward the establishment of a global
regime of the rule of law. As Ruti Teitel has observed, "[m]ore and more, a depoliticized legalist
language of right and wrongs, duties and obligations, is supplanting the dominant political language
based on state interests, deliberation, and consensus." Teitel, supra note 86, at 372.
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spumed because it might lead to parochial local judgments, fragmentation, and
incoherence.9 0
On a closer look, however, top-down theories of international
prosecutions seem to rest on a series of overstated claims. David Wippman
has argued persuasively that the deterrent effect of international trials is at best
minimal.9' Jos6 Alvarez has pointed out that the impartiality and record-
building functions of international tribunals have often been exaggerated.92
Several more critiques of the centralized model are explored in the
Sections below. First, because international criminal tribunals are isolated
from the communities affected by their decisions, the tribunals' judgments are
neither tested nor informed by diverse perspectives. Furthermore, the results
of international prosecutions hardly foster the internalization of international
norms and may in fact engender backlash by local communities. Finally,
international trials far from the place where the crimes occurred do little to
promote post-conflict reconciliation or the rebuilding of the rule of law.
B. The Problem with Insularity: Weaker Claims to a Legitimate Mandate
of Interpreting the Law
While international law scholars are happy to focus on the ICC's
contribution to a uniform and truly global criminal law, the court's isolation
from a structured political community is likely to undermine the legitimacy of
the court's decisions. Although the court might enjoy a level of international
legitimacy for the reasons outlined in the previous Section, it is likely to lack
support among the populations most directly affected by its decisions. If the
court develops international criminal law in a centralized fashion, from the top
-down, it may also undermine the important values of deliberation,
inclusiveness, autonomy, and democratic accountability.
The first major challenge to the ICC's legitimacy comes from the
open-ended nature of international criminal law. International criminal law is
still full of gaps and ambiguities, and the ICC will inevitably have to make
difficult policy and moral judgments when defining the shape of the law.93
Unlike a technocratic agency that grounds its legitimacy in scientific or
technical expertise, the ICC cannot simply rely on the skill of its judges to
resolve contested legal, moral, and political questions. Furthermore, the court
is not a part of a structured system of checks and balances. For that reason, the
legitimacy of the ICC's mandates will depend above all on the court's
meaningful engagement with the states and populations most affected by its
decisions.
90 Cf Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or
Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 272-74 (2001); Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law
Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 105, 134 (1998).
91 David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 473, 473 (1999); Wippman, supra note 7, at *9-18.
92 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 442-50.
93 Madeline Morris, The Democratic Dilemma of the International Criminal Court, 5 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 591, 597-98 (2002); see also Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The
Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 136 (1995).
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Consider several examples of potentially controversial determinations
that ICC judges will have to make: Must a state use precision-guided
munitions to minimize collateral damage? 9' What constitutes "proportionality
and necessity" in military action?9 What is the precise boundary between
military and civilian targets? '  Criminal law itself is full of trying moral
questions that are difficult to decide outside the frame of reference that a
political community and its norms provide. Moreover, "[e]ven elementary
concepts such as accessory liability or duress cannot be divorced from the
implicit construction of moral theories as to what constitutes blameworthy
human conduct under extreme circumstances of mass violence." 97  Finally,
sentencing determinations might also prove controversial, particularly when
out of sync with national punishments. 9
The court will rarely find much support in the statutory text for the
many difficult decisions it will have to make." The six official languages in
which the Statute was written will further complicate textualist readings. '°°
ICC judges will not have a solid body of precedent to guide them in their
interpretation. The jurisprudence on crimes against humanity, genocide, and
war crimes is largely limited to the judgments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals and the ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The difficulty
that the ICC Preparatory Commission had in writing the Elements of Crimes
(which are to serve as nonbinding interpretive guidelines to judges) is a
reflection of the scarcity of authoritative sources and agreement on the content
of international criminal law.' 1
Given the indeterminacy of international criminal law and the diversity
of views on its scope and content, it is not surprising that the ICC's mandate to
interpret and enforce the law has already been contested. The challenge to the
ICC's legitimacy and authority has three dimensions. First, commentators
have pointed out that few structural checks exist to ensure that the court's
power is being used fairly and consistently. 2 Second, some scholars have
94 Morris, supra note 93, at 597.
95 ICC Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv); International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes art. 8(2)(b)(iii),
ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sep. 3-10, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes]; Ruth Wedgwood,
The Irresolution of Rome, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 2001, at 193, 194.
96 Wedgwood, supra note 95, at 194.
97 Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Court in Context: Mediating the Global and
Local in the Age ofAccountability, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 712, 720 (2003) (book review).
98 See infra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
99 The ICC Elements of Crimes, which were meant to provide more detailed guidance, are not
binding on the judges. ICC Statute art. 9. The United States submitted a proposal that would have
made them binding, but it was rejected. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.69 (14 July 1998), cited in Philippe
Kirsch & Valerie Oosterveld, The Post-Rome Preparatory Commission, in THE ROME STATUTE,
supra note 1, at 93, 97.
100 ICC Statute art. 128 (stating that the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish
versions of the Statute are equally authentic).
l0l Kirsch & Oosterveld, supra note 99, at 98 ("The second obstacle was that such a document
had never before been elaborated in international law. While some crimes had been examined by the
Nuremberg, Tokyo, former Yugoslav, and Rwandan international criminal tribunals, many crimes had
not. Even in those cases where crimes had been discussed, their elements were often unclear.").
102 U.S. policymakers and commentators have expressed concern over the wide scope of
discretion that the ICC prosecutor enjoys under the Rome Statute. See Chris Lombardi, Hot Seat, 89
A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (2003); Will, supra note 4. The prosecutor can open investigations on her own
initiative, but her actions are subject to review by a three-judge ICC pre-Trial Chamber, which must
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argued persuasively that the court cannot base its authority exclusively on state
consent, because it can exercise its jurisdiction over nationals of states that are
not parties to the ICC Treaty."3 And third-the point on which I focus in this
Section-the insularity of the court from diverse local opinions puts in
question the extent to which the court's interpretations of international criminal
law can be informed and legitimate.
When American commentators have charged the ICC with being
unaccountable, they have usually focused on the lack of checks and balances in
the court's structure.'" In particular, they have expressed concern about the
lack of meaningful constraints on the prosecutor's powers. '  The ICC
prosecutor is said to have a wide scope of discretion because she can open
investigations on her own initiative, without any external oversight. There are
no guidelines that could limit ex ante prosecutorial screening and charging
decisions."'° Although the prosecutor's actions are subject to review by a three-
judge panel of ICC judges, and to a lesser extent, by the Assembly of States
Parties to the ICC,0 7 the U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference argued that
these constraints are not sufficient and that the consent of interested states
should be required to authorize an investigation.
American critics have focused less on the scope of judicial discretion,
but it is easy to see how the argument about lack of accountability would
extend to judicial actions. The point is not that judges should be directly
responsible to an electorate at the national or international level. Courts serve
important countermajoritarian functions."' They derive their legitimacy to a
great extent from principled and reasoned decisionmaking, their legal
expertise, and their impartiality." But perhaps in recognition of the tenuous
nature of such legitimacy, additional safeguards have been placed on judicial
decisionmaking at the national level. Legislatures can rewrite a statute when
they believe that judges interpreting the statute have overstepped their
find a reasonable basis for investigation. ICC Statute art. 15(4). The United States, as well as some
other states that took part in the negotiations of the ICC Treaty did not see this review as an adequate
check on prosecutorial discretion and suggested that the prosecutor should have the consent of
interested states before proceeding with an investigation. 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note
18, para. 25.
103 E.g., Morris, supra note 93, at 597.
104 Cf. John Bolton, Toward an International Criminal Court? A Debate, 14 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 159, 164 (2000) (observing that the court is "not part of any ordered structure of
accountability").
105 See, e.g., John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
The United States and the International Criminal Court, Remarks to the Federalist Society (Nov. 14,
2002), at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/1 5158.htm.
106 Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 510-11 (2003).
107 Id. at 524-25 (2003) (noting that the Assembly of States Parties is unlikely to act as a strong
check on the ICC Prosecutor and that judicial review, "while exerted at every level of prosecutorial
decisionmaking, does not extend to judging the wisdom of prosecutorial actions").
108 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-79
(1980).
109 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92-101(1982); Robert
Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law. The Early
Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 35, 42 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2001); Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 312-13
(1997).
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mandate."' Residence requirements also increase the likelihood that judges
will consider the preferences of the community affected by their decisions.
Yet ICC judges will be far from the populations that their verdicts will
affect, and no international legislature exists that could revise the ICC's
interpretations of international criminal law when these interpretations are out
of sync with statutory text, legislative intent, or popular preferences."' The
Assembly of State Parties, which does have the power to amend the ICC
Statute and Elements of Crimes, is a poor substitute for a legislature."2 The
Assembly delegates are usually career civil servants in their respective
countries' executive branches and already several degrees removed from the
popular will."' As other commentators have already observed, the Assembly is
likely to be torn by internal disputes and ineffective as an oversight
mechanism."' Moreover, because the Assembly will make decisions by a
majority or supermajority vote, the preferences of one-third or more of the
member states, including the states most affected by the court's decisions, can
be ignored in the final Assembly decisions."' Although we accept majority
vote in domestic politics, at the international level, where decisionmaking is
several degrees removed from the popular will, state consent is still considered
by many to be essential to adequate representation."'
The ICC, however, cannot base its legitimacy exclusively on state
consent. The court has the power to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of
states that are not parties to the Rome Statute, as long as the state on whose
territory the crime occurred consents. In Madeline Morris's terms, "[t]here is
110 Cf Karen Alter, Delegation to International Courts: Four Varieties and Their Implications for
State-Court Relations 52 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
II Part of the problem may be that, at least at this stage of human history, there is not enough
integration across national lines to produce an international demos that might be represented by an
international legislature.
112 Given the important check that the Assembly could provide, however, it is not surprising to
see that the United States-the main proponent of greater accountability of the ICC-has been
pushing for a greater role by the Assembly in the court's decisionmaking structure.
113 Cf Robert A. Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen
Participation, 109 POL. SCi. Q. 23, 32 (1994) (observing the lack of democratic process in
transnational structures where "decisions are made by unelected delegates appointed by national
governments, many of which, and in some cases most of which, are not themselves dependent on
elections"); Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 489, 491 (2001) (observing that intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs") are seen as
undemocratic because they are run "by an elite group of national officials who are instructed by their
respective executives, and by international secretariats whose staffs at times act independently of the
top IGO management").
114 Danner, supra note 106, at 524; see also HAROLD K. JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF
INTERDEPENDENCE 119 (1984) (observing that "representative bodies [of international institutions]
often find it hard to frame coherent policies").
Hs This will not be as large a problem with respect to amendments of the substantive definitions
of crimes, however, because such amendments will not be binding on the states that vote against them.
ICC Statute art. 121(4).
16 Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitimacy: The Rome's Statute Unlawful
Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 63, 64-65, 67-68 (2003); Morris, supra note 93, at
592-94, 600; J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2473 (1991)
(arguing that the veto power of EU member states in the Council of Ministers contributes to the
legitimacy of the organization, whereas a shift toward majority would exacerbate the "democratic
deficit" of the European Union). This is a problem inherent in international governance more
generally: As the scale of government increases, the opportunities for citizen participation decrease.
See Dal, supra note 113, at 29-39.
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no democratic linkage between the ICC and those non-party nationals over




Some scholars have even begun to question the sufficiency of state
consent for legitimizing the actions of international institutions. Given the
limited opportunities available to an individual state or even a group of states
to sanction an international institution acting outside its delegated powers,
national communities have no meaningful "voice" in the oversight of
international institutions."' As a remedy to this problem, scholars have called
for participation by nationally elected delegates in the governance of
international institutions."9  Some have even suggested holding national
referenda on major issues facing international organizations.'20 While these
suggestions are important in giving national constituencies a voice in the
governance and lawmaking of international organizations, they would not
apply to the adjudicative functions of institutions like the ICC.
As this Article argues, however, there are other ways in which
international adjudication could be anchored more closely to national
democratic processes. First, the court itself could exercise deference to local
norms in its jurisprudence. Similar suggestions have been made in discussing
ways to legitimize the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement
mechanism: "In the adjudication process, when facing a claim that national
legislation restricts trade contrary to the Agreement, the panel should reject the
claim of illegality... when 'the national measure reflects a deeply embedded
value (which at times may be idiosyncratic)' and 'enjoy[s] the clear support of
[that country's] population."" 2' Conscious of its tenuous democratic link to
national constituencies, the European Court of Human Rights also grants
national authorities a "margin of appreciation" when evaluating the legality of
their practices.'22
An even more direct way of ensuring the accountability and legitimacy
of the International Criminal Court is the mixed-court model advocated in this
Article. The ICC-as-mixed-court would engage national judges and
prosecutors, alongside their ICC counterparts, in the development and
enforcement of international criminal law. Because these officials are more
117 Madeline Morris, Lacking a Leviathan: The Quandaries of Peace and Accountability, in
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 135, 138 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002); see also Casey & Rivkin, supra
note 116, at 85-89. But see Michael Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-Party
States, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 213 (Sarah B. Sewall &
Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) (arguing that the ICC's jurisdiction over nationals of nonparty states is well
grounded in international law).
18 E.g., Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the
Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD 25, 29 (2003)
(connecting legitimacy to "public accountability" because of a "widely-shared expectation that the
people affected by a certain normative structure should be involved in its design and
implementation"). But see Danner, supra note 106, at 524 (positing a model of "pragmatic
accountability" of the ICC Prosecutor, where states can exercise oversight over the Prosecutor through
their choices whether or not to cooperate with her).
1,9 Stein, supra note 113, at 532.
120 I a.
121 Jefferey Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice and
International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 229, 234, 261 (1998), cited in Stein, supra note 113,
at 505.
122 See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
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likely to be attuned to the interests and preferences of local populations, their
involvement will be an important step in increasing the court's accountability
and inclusiveness.
The closer connection of the ICC mixed courts to domestic legal
processes would also further the ideals of self-determination and cross-cultural
deliberation. As discussed earlier, the international legal community has failed
to generate on its own norms that could both provide meaningful guidance to
ICC judges and claim wide acceptance by diverse postconflict societies. At the
international level, real agreement exists on only a small set of fundamental
norms, such as basic norms of due process and the core prohibitions on
genocide and crimes against humanity.'23 Encouraging national communities to
supplement these broad international norms with more concrete rules and
interpretations of their own is consistent with ideals of autonomy and self-
determination. It provides those communities with the opportunity to
influence, in accordance with their core values, the laws and institutions that
govern them. It also gives national communities a more meaningful voice in
shaping the course of international criminal law from the bottom-up.
The mixed-court model of developing international criminal law is
more legitimate in yet another sense-it encourages deliberation among
diverse participants and is thus more likely to produce informed and politically
acceptable decisions. As deliberative democratic theorists have argued, the
airing of conflicting opinions is essential to correct judgments, in both politics
and law."' Deliberation among diverse participants offers "the conditions
whereby actors can widen their own limited and fallible perspectives by
drawing on each other's knowledge, experience and capabilities.""'2 On this
account, truth and legitimacy are discovered in the interaction and
communication among individuals of diverse backgrounds and experiences.
The current ICC structure does not promote this deliberative
democratic ideal. The court is located in The Hague, far from the places where
most of the conflicts it adjudicates are likely to occur. It has a limited number
of judges, and the judges' relatively uniform training and outlook on
international law narrows the range of opinions likely to be represented at the
court. 6 The judges' likely lack of appreciation for the diversity of opinions
123 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996) (discussing wide disagreement among scholars,
lawyers, and states about which rights are fundamental and constitute obligations upon the
international community as a whole).
124 JORGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 50-68 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1979) (arguing that deliberation is a means for discovering the truth); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 58 (1859) ("Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of
the reconciling and combining of opposites that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and
impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners."); Hilary Putnam, A
Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1682 (1990) (citing Dewey for the
proposition that experimental inquiry combined with free and full discussion is the best way of
resolving social problems).
125 Graham Smith & Corinne Wales, Citizens' Juries and Deliberative Democracy, 48 POL.
STUD. 51, 53-54 (2000); see also Iontcheva, supra note 6, at 339-43.
126 Although more than half of the eighteen judges are supposed to be specialists in criminal,
rather than international law, fifteen of the current eighteen judges have extensive training and
practice in international law. Only a few of the judges come from countries that have recently gone
through a period of massive human rights abuses.
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about the content of international criminal law might compromise the
legitimacy of the court's verdicts.
Applying the insights of deliberative democrats, we may want to
diversify the personnel of the ICC and involve judges and prosecutors from the
communities most affected by the decisions of the ICC.'27 These individuals
are particularly likely to enrich the discourse about international criminal law
by bringing to bear their unique experiences of living and working in a
postconflict society. The benefits of deliberation may also accrue in the
interactions among diverse institutions-for example, in an ongoing dialogue
among national and international courts, or among mixed courts and an
overarching international criminal appeals chamber. '28  Whereas a sole
international criminal tribunal would tend to reinforce the already existing
consensus among international lawyers, multiple venues for the pursuit of
international criminal justice, at the national and international level, may
encourage a more constructive debate among conflicting perspectives."9
127 The Court could also involve lay participants as jurors. Many common law and civil law
systems around the world use jurors in their proceedings, often alongside professional judges in
mixed-court proceedings. Because such a reform would require a radical reconsideration and
rewriting of the ICC Statute, however, it is not considered at length here.
128 For a more detailed discussion of the coordinating role of the Appeals Chamber, see
discussion infra Sections III.A & III.B.2.b. On the benefits of transnational judicial dialogue, see
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000); Jenny S. Martinez,
Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429, 466-68 (2003) (observing, inter alia,
that "dialogue is not a second-best alternative to a hierarchical ordering of voices but the best
foundation for such a system"); William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System
of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 63-64 (2002).
129 Cf Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of
International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 700 (1999) (arguing that the
multiplicity of international tribunals promotes "experimentation and exploration, which can lead to
improvements in international law").
The status of the death penalty in international criminal law provides a good illustration of the
importance of deliberation among diverse participants. An overwhelming majority of international
lawyers agrees that the death penalty should not be available in international tribunals. Cf
ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 361; William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the
Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 797, 799 (1998). This view prevailed during the Rome
negotiations, despite the opposition by countries that maintain the death penalty for ordinary crimes.
States with a predominantly Muslim population, for example, argued that "if the statute [were] to be
considered representative of all systems .. . , it should include the death penalty." See Press Release,
United Nations, Discussion Turns to Range and Definition of Penalties in Draft Statute in Preparatory
Committee on International Criminal Court, L/2805 (Aug. 22, 1996), at
http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive/documentsreports/2PrepCmt/DPIPenalties22Aug96.pdf (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005). A major reason for excluding the death penalty was a strong insistence for that
exclusion by European states, which have constitutional provisions prohibiting them from extraditing
a suspect if he or she might face the death penalty in the country making the extradition request.
Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 24, at 86. Outside the narrow circle of international lawyers, however,
many jurists and nonlegal scholars continue to find reasonable grounds on which to support the death
penalty. E.g., GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 355 (1995);
PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE CURRENT DEBATE (Stuart E. Rosenbaum & Robert M.
Baird eds., 1995). And in many states across the world (including some of those who have abolished
capital punishment), a substantial number of people support the death penalty, even for ordinary
crimes. E.g., Dick J. Hessing et al., Explaining Capital Punishment Support in an Abolitionist
Country: The Case of the Netherlands, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 605, 605-06 (2003).
At the International Criminal Court, however, such debates about the death penalty have been
foreclosed because of the solid consensus among international judges on the issue. By contrast, as the
debates about hybrid courts in Iraq illustrate, when local and international judges work together, these
debates will inevitably take place. E.g., Vanessa Blum, Crafting Justice in Iraq: The Bush
Administration Backs Iraqi Court Plan Criticized by Many in International Legal Community, LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at 25.
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Arguments about subsidiarity in the European Union and federalism in the
United States, which emphasize the importance of "laboratories of
experimentation" in developing and enforcing the law, echo the same
insights.'30
As students of federalism and subsidiarity are well aware, of course,
deliberation has significant costs. These include delays, disruptions and
uncertainty resulting from conflicts among judges and prosecutors with
different perspectives, and among institutions with different priorities. Yet
federal systems have devised structural arrangements to cope with such
conflict and to find the right balance between, on the one hand, deliberation
and democracy, and on the other, efficiency and uniformity. As Part III
discusses in greater detail, an ICC-sponsored system of hybrid courts, with an
overarching Appeals Chamber and well-established rules and presumptions in
resolving jurisdictional conflicts, similarly presents a feasible mechanism for
mediating between these competing values.
C. The Problem with Distant Prosecutions: Domestic Resistance
The ICC's distance from the communities directly affected by
international crimes is also likely to impair its political acceptability within
those communities. Evidence from other human rights regimes suggests that if
the court attempts to impose its mandates in a heavy, top-down fashion and is
not attuned to local political processes and preferences, it may provoke
resistance and even a counterreaction to international norms and practices.
The history of the ad hoc tribunals reveals that the remoteness of
international tribunals damages their legitimacy and effectiveness with local
populations. In the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY has been perceived as a
distant and often biased'3' tribunal with little relevance to the reconciliation
process in the countries of the region. '  Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians have
learned about the Tribunal from piecemeal headline reports from The Hague
and are thus "out of touch with the court's day-to-day proceedings.' 3   Even
legal professionals admit they do not understand the ICTY procedures, because
130 E.g., Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (2003); Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in Foreign Affairs Law
(2004) (manuscript on file with author) (using insights from federal courts law to address the
allocation of responsibilities among national and supranational organizations with respect to issues
over which they have overlapping jurisdiction).
131 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY,
JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 29-33 (2000), at
http://www.hrcberkeley.org/download/bosnia.00-I.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (citing interviews
with Bosnian Serb and Croat judges who accused the ICTY of lacking independence and impartiality)
[hereinafter JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY]; Justin Brown, World, Facing Up to Atrocities?, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16, 1999, at 6.
132 Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability To Provide Adequate Justice: Lessons
from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 353, 355 (2001). Perhaps in recognition of
the need to engage local judiciaries to a greater extent, the ICTY recently adopted Rule II bis, which
permits the referral of a case under indictment to the authorities of a state of which the accused is a
national or where the crime was committed. ICTY R. PROC. & EVID., R. 11 bis(A), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last revised August 12, 2004).
133 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WAR CRIMINALS IN BOSNIA'S REPUBLIKA SRPsKA 75
(2000).
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of the distance of the Tribunal and because of its unique blend of civil and
common law procedures.'34
Given the limited access that local populations have to the Hague-
based Tribunal, it is not surprising to find that the Tribunal's image in the
former Yugoslavia is less than perfect: "Most Croats and Serbs view[] the
Tribunal as utterly biased against their communities, and as more than willing
to turn a blind eye to atrocities committed by Bosniaks."'3 Indicted Serbs and
Croats have been hailed as heroes by some in their home countries,'36 while
support for cooperation with the ICTY remains minimal.'37 At the same time,
"large parts of the Bosniak community [are] disappointed by the Tribunal" and
see it "as a cynical gesture to salve the guilty conscience of the West."'3
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has also been
criticized for its remoteness from the place where the crimes that it judges took
place.'39  Hearing about the ICTR from sparse radio broadcasts, most
Rwandans view the ICTR as an "inherently foreign" institution that has
"forfeited any impact on Rwandan society. '
Local governments and communities have also complained about the
discrepancies between their concerns and the international tribunals' priorities.
Both Rwandans and Bosnians have expressed disappointment with the slow
pace of the tribunals' work."' Some Rwandans have also complained about the
extraordinary-by Rwandan standards-procedural protections afforded to
defendants.' 2 Most controversially, many Rwandans, including government
officials, have expressed frustration with the work of the ICTR because the
tribunal does not apply the death penalty to the high-level officials it convicts
of genocide, even as many lower-level executioners of the genocide are
134 JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 131, at 34.
135 Sandra Coliver, The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia to Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 19, 20 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000), cited in Wippman, supra note 7, at *19.
136 Peter S. Green, A Fugitive Croatia General Is a Hometown Favorite, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2003, at A12. One indictee, Vojislav Seselj, campaigned on behalf of his party from his cell in The
Hague and helped the party achieve an unexpected victory in the parliamentary elections. Marlise
Simons, Another Serb Defendant Stays on His Best Bad Behavior, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A4.
Party officials considered giving Mr. Seselj a seat in parliament despite his detention in The Hague.
Poll Setback for Serb Reformers as Nationalists Make Large Gains, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at 1.
37 Steven Erlanger, Did Serbia's Leader Do the West's Bidding Too Well?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2003, at 4 (reporting that only 12% of Serbs support extraditions of Serb suspects to The Hague).
138 Coliver, supra note 135, at 21.
139 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External Perceptions of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21, 29 (2002); Remy
Ourdan, Un tribunal loin de Rwanda, LE MONDE, Apr. 4, 1998, LEXIS, News & Business Library, Le
Monde (FR) File (reporting that few Rwandans follow the ICTR's work).
140 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA:
JUSTICE DELAYED 24 (2001).
141 Remy Ourdan, La Laborieuse Invention d'une Justice Internationale, LE MONDE, June 18,
1998, LEXIS, News & Business Library, Le Monde (FR) File (noting victims' disappointment with
the slow pace of ICTR proceedings). Rwanda's representative to the UN General Assembly pointed
out in 1999 that while the ICTR had only indicted forty-eight individuals and tried and sentenced only
four of them, Rwandan courts have issued more than 20,000 indictments, held 1,989 trials, and
accepted 17,847 guilty pleas. Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International
Justice, supra note 91, at 482 (citing statement of Joseph Mutaboba).
142 Remy Ourdan, supra note 141.
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sentenced to death in Rwandan courts.13  As one Rwandan official wryly
observed, "[i]t doesn't fit our definition of justice to think of the authors of the
Rwandan genocide sitting in a full-service Swedish prison with a television."'"
The Tribunal has also been criticized for failing to treat victims with
sufficient respect. This latter disagreement became so serious that Rwandan
victims' rights organizations began urging Rwandans not to testify before or
cooperate with the court.15 The Rwandan government's dissatisfaction with
the ICTR's policies was also one of the reasons that led Rwanda to lobby for
the removal of Carla del Ponte from her position as chief prosecutor of the
ICTR.'"
Recent evidence of states' withdrawal from a regional human rights
regime confirms that when an international tribunal attempts to dictate the law
from above, disregarding local preferences and enforcement capabilities, the
tribunal is unlikely to be successful over the long run. In the late 1990s, three
Caribbean states-Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica-withdrew
from several international human rights treaties, largely as a result of an overly
demanding interpretation of the Caribbean states' human rights obligations by
the region's highest appellate court, the Privy Council, which is based in
London and staffed with British judges.' 7 After the Privy Council broadly
interpreted the meaning of the international prohibition on "degrading or
inhuman treatment or punishment," all Caribbean states found themselves
saddled with new obligations in imposing the death penalty. Because they did
not have the resources to fulfill their newly imposed duties, the affected
countries could take one of three courses: stop imposing capital punishment,
flout their international human rights obligations, or denounce those
obligations outright. Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica (the three
states with the highest number of capital cases and the greatest resource
problem) chose the third option and withdrew from the relevant international
human rights treaties.'
4
The Caribbean countries' treaty denunciations demonstrate the
resistance an international court can provoke when it attempts to change by
143 PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH To INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAMILIES 131, 245-46 (1998); Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction:
The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 371 (1997); James C. McKinley, Jr., Ex-
Rwandan Premier Gets Life in Prison on Charges of Genocide in '94 Massacres, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
1998, at A4.
144 GOUREVITCH, supra note 143, at 255.
145 Stephen Smith, En Jugeant le Diable, le Tribunal d'Arusha Joue sa Credibilite, LE MONDE,
Apr. 4, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business Library, Le Monde (FR) File (noting that Ibuka, a Rwandan
victims' organization, no longer cooperates with the ICTR because it believes that the ICTR does not
do enough to protect testifying victims).
146 Carla Del Ponte Replaced As ICTR Prosecutor, Africa News, Aug. 29, 2003, LEXIS, News
& Business Library, Africa News File. Commentators have suggested that the Rwandan government
petitioned for her removal because some officials were concerned they were vulnerable to prosecution
under her leadership of the ICTR. See Felicity Barringer, Annan Is Said To Want New Prosecutor for
Rwanda War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at A 1.
147 See generally Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1832 (2002) (arguing that the "overlegalization," or the increasing constraints placed on
sovereignty by rules and review mechanisms, was a key reason for the withdrawal of the Carribbean
countries from international human rights treaties).
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judicial fiat the treaty obligations of a state within its jurisdiction.' 9
Particularly where the new obligations conflict with deeply held social norms
(in the case of the Caribbean countries, in support of capital punishment),
international tribunals that proceed too fast and over strong objections by local
constituencies are likely to see their authority challenged.'50
D. The Problem with Local Non-Involvement: Inability to Achieve
Reconciliation and Rebuild the Rule of Law
Remote international prosecutions may also be less adept at promoting
national self-reckoning and reconciliation in the aftermath of violent conflict.
To achieve the cathartic and reconciliation benefits of war crimes trials,
nations must take on war crimes trials themselves.'5 ' The exercise of
jurisdiction over war crimes allows a country to come to terms with its past
and to demonstrate the power of the judicial system to "domesticate chaos."'5 2
The assertion of jurisdiction is an indispensable part of a community's healing
process. "3 Because local trials are more extensively covered in the media and
more easily attended and monitored by the local population, they are more
likely to stimulate public discussion and to "foster the liberal virtues of
tolerations, moderation, and civil respect." ''5 For all these reasons, such trials
are essential to rebuilding a system based on the rule of law.
Media commentaries in countries dealing with postconflict justice
confirm the links between local trials, public debate, reconciliation, and
societal "healing." When South Korea tried its own dictators Chun Doo Hwan
and Roh Tae Woo on charges of mutiny and treason for staging a coup and
murdering approximately two hundred student protesters, South Koreans
followed the proceedings closely. One journalist reports that "[t]he trial has
been viewed by many South Koreans less as a hearing on the specific crimes
committed more than a decade ago by aging military leaders than as a pivotal
step toward the establishment of the rule of law by a country trying to cleanse
itself of its brutal and corrupt past.'55  Similarly, recent trials in France of
Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier, officials in the French Vichy government
149 A court may do that by "adding new obligations, specifying existing obligations with greater
particularity, or strengthening mechanisms for review and enforcement." Id. at 1855.
ISO As Dan Kahan has argued in the domestic context, "[i]f the law condemns too severely-if it
tries to break the grip of the contested norm (and the will of its supporters) with a 'hard shove'-it
will likely prove a dead letter and could even backfire." Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 609 (2000).
151 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 482.
152 Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV 311, 432-33
(2002); see also Bill Keller, Digging Up the Dead, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2003, at A19 (arguing that
trying some war criminals on their own would let Iraqis "reclaim a measure of national honor").
153 See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 14-16 (1997)
(describing war crimes trials as constructing the "collective memories" that may help cleanse victims,
perpetrators, and even whole nations of their brutal past); Berman, supra note 152, at 434 (noting that
the trial of accused war criminal Klaus Barbie had that effect on France).
154 OSIEL, supra note 153, at 2.
155 Id. at 6.
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during World War II, provided "psychotherapy on a nationwide scale"'56 and
became "the vehicle for debate on the legitimacy and activities of the Vichy
regime.'.. 7 In Argentina, during the trials of military officials for murders and
"disappearances" of leftist activists in the 1970s,
all the media gave ample coverage to an event that was
discussed in squares and cafes, by poor and rich alike.
Through this discussion, a public space was appropriated, a
voice rediscovered... [and it] seemed as though common
people would be able at last to come to terms with their own
experiences of fear, silence, and death."'
Finally, the Eichmann trial in Israel "compelled an entire nation to undergo a
process of self-reckoning and overwhelmed it with a painful search for its
identity."'59
When an international tribunal deprives states of the opportunity to
face the past through criminal trials, it impedes their progress toward
reconciliation and reconstruction of a society built on the rule of law. Consider
the record of the ad hoc international criminal courts. Compared to the trials in
France, Argentina, Israel, and South Korea, ICTR and ICTY trials were neither
as widely covered in the local media nor as closely followed by the affected
local populations. Nor have the ICTY and ICTR aided local judiciaries to
undertake war crimes prosecutions and thereby lead the country on the road to
reconciliation and the establishment of a society governed by the rule of law.
For a long time, the ICTY all but ignored national judiciaries in the
former Yugoslavia, deeming them biased and thus unfit to hold trials
consistent with international standards of due process. Even as the Court
developed an outreach program designed to raise publicity in the region about
its own work, the court made no systematic attempt to share its legal and
technical expertise with local judges or to engage these judges in cooperative
proceedings.'0 As one former ICTY official bemoaned, while the international
community has spent millions of dollars on the Tribunal in The Hague, it has
put surprisingly little effort and money into legal reform in the former
156 HENRY Rousso, THE VICHY SYNDROME: HISTORY AND MEMORY IN FRANCE SINCE 1944
210 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1991) (1987) (quoting French historian Emmanuel Le Roy Laudrie),
cited in OSIEL, supra note 153, at 14.
157 Leila S. Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier for Crimes
Against Humanity in France, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 191, 191 (1995), cited in OSIEL, supra note
153, at 14.
158 Carina Perelli, Memoria de Sangre: Fear, Hope, and Disenchantment in Argentina, in
REMAPPING MEMORY 39, 49-50 (Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1994), cited in OSIEL, supra note 153, at 14-
15. While Carlos Menem eventually pardoned the military officers who had been convicted by
Argentinean courts under his predecessor, Raul Alfonsin, this act does not negate the importance of
national trials. The awareness-raising potential of this process is demonstrated by the most recent
elections in Argentina, in which Nestor Kirchner came to power partly thanks to his promise to reopen
trials for crimes committed during the dirty war. Larry Rohter, Now the Dirtiest of Wars Won't Be
Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at A4.
159 Haim Gouri, Facing the Glass Booth, in HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE: THE SHAPES OF
MEMORY 153, 155 (Geoffrey H. Hartman ed., 1994), cited in OSIEL, supra note 153, at 16; see also
TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 351 (1993) (observing that
the trial served as a sort of national group therapy), cited in OSIEL, supra note 153, at 16.
160 David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen
Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2002, at 7.
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Yugoslavia.'' Bosnian judges themselves have expressed frustration at their
marginalization in this process.' Unsurprisingly, the "tribunal's long-term
impact on the systems of justice in the area of conflict has been minimal."'6 3
As a result, "there is virtually no effective enforcement of these important laws
in the courts that ultimately matter most, i.e., the region's domestic courts.""6
The ICTR, by trying high-level officials, but leaving the hundreds of
thousands of "small fish" to Rwandan tribunals, may itself have helped
reinforce perceptions of the inadequacy of the Rwandan justice system. Had
the tribunal left one or more high-stakes trials to national courts, it could have
helped efforts to affirm the rule of law in Rwanda. As Jos6 Alvarez observes,
[a] local trial for Bagasora [a colonel indicted on genocide
charges by the ICTR], even one subject to extensive
international observation or even the possibility of appeal to
the ICTR, would have affirmed to the world, and most
importantly to all Rwandans, that Rwanda's institutions,
including its judiciary, were capable of rendering justice even
with respect to formerly exalted public officials.'65
For all the reasons discussed in this Section-the limited
accountability and diversity of the ICC, the court's remoteness from the place
where the crime was committed, and its minimal impact on reconciliation-the
real success of international criminal law will come when domestic legal
systems begin enforcing human rights principles more consistently. As
Jonathan Charney has argued, "[t]he test of that success is not a large docket of
cases before the ICC, but persistent and comprehensive domestic criminal
proceedings worldwide, facilitated by progress in a variety of contexts toward
discouraging international crimes and avoiding impunity.""
III. THE ICC AS AN AID TO LOCAL JUSTICE
If international criminal law is best enforced in a decentralized fashion,
what is left for the ICC to do? Contrary to what many conservatives and
political realists might argue, the ICC need not fold up its operations. The
court can and should play an important role in encouraging and assisting
national courts in the enforcement of human rights and humanitarian law. By
collaborating with national courts in war crimes prosecutions, the court could
have a less dominant, but more enduring effect on the implementation of
international criminal law.
161 Id. at 8, 12.
162 JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 131, at 36-39 (documenting complaints by Bosnian
officials that they were treated with disrespect by ICTY officials and that they did not have open
channels of communication with the ICTY).
Tolbert, supra note 160, at 8.
164 Id.
165 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 402.
Jonathan Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts, 95 AM. J.
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A. The Case for Engaging National Authorities
Even if centralization has many problems, eliminating the ICC
altogether is not a better alternative. Advocates of the International Criminal
Court have repeatedly pointed out the failure of various national governments
to fulfill their responsibility to prosecute international crimes.'67 From the
Congo, to Cambodia, to Uruguay, a number of national authorities have been
either unwilling or unable to try alleged war criminals. Victims have remained
without recourse to justice, the rule of law in those countries has suffered, and
international criminal law has remained a dead letter.
The ICC does have the potential to make a difference in the
enforcement of international criminal law in those countries. It can do so not
so much by issuing progressive opinions from the bench in The Hague, but
rather by prodding and assisting national authorities to fulfill their duty to
prosecute international crimes. This role for the ICC may be less visible
internationally and its influence may be felt more slowly. Its effect on
domestic constituencies around the globe, however, will be more enduring.
Evidence from other international courts suggests that this
incrementalist approach of working with national authorities and national elites
is indeed effective. Two of the more successful supranational courts, the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") and the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR"), have worked closely with domestic actors-courts, agencies,
organizations, and private citizens-to ground their legal authority. Observers
of the ECJ have emphasized the extent to which it has relied on national
institutions to reinforce and even expand its jurisdiction.'6 8 The court achieved
enforcement of its mandates "by 'shaming' and 'co-opting' domestic law-
makers, judges and citizens, who pressure governments from within for
compliance."''6 9  Because the ECJ relied predominantly on the referral cases
from national courts, it engaged in a conscious effort to win the "cooperation
and goodwill of the state courts."'7 In its extensive publicity and education
campaigns, the court invited state judges to seminars, dinners, and regular
visits to the ECJ's chambers in Luxembourg.''
Unlike the ECJ, which has depended largely on national courts for its
caseload, the ECHR can receive petitions from individual litigants, and that is
where most of its cases have come from. As a result, the ECHR has had to
strike a delicate balance between appealing directly to individuals and
167 Cassese, supra note 82, at 5-6; Richard H. Stanley, Establishing an International Criminal
Court and the Pursuit of Justice, in REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 207, 208 (Christopher C. Joyner & M. Cherif
Bassiouni eds., 1998); Sadat Wexler, supra note 9, at 710.
168 Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and
Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 157, 179-80 (1995); cf Slaughter & Heifer, supra note 109, at
291 (arguing that the ECJ was particularly interested in, and effective at, establishing close relations
with national courts because it depended on those courts to refer cases to it and to provide "domestic
enforcement mechanisms for its judgments").
,69 Moravcsik, supra note 168, at 157.
170 G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
595, 605 (1989), cited in Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 109, at 302.
171 HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 247
(1986), cited in Slaughter & Heifer, supra note 109, at 302.
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organizations that represent its interests, and developing strong ties to state
authorities who would ultimately be responsible for implementing the court's
decisions. '72 To address the latter concern, early in its operation, the ECHR
developed the doctrine of margin of appreciation, which gives states some
leeway in interpreting and applying the European Convention on Human
Rights. "  The court recognized that "a government's discharge of [its]
responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex
factors and of balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest""'7 and
expressed respect for the space that the government needs to make these
difficult policy determinations. In deciding how wide a margin to afford to a
government, the ECHR has looked to the degree of consensus among the
national laws of signatory states with respect to the challenged policy.'
As the next two Sections elaborate on in more detail, the ICC could
engage local courts and prosecutors just as the European Courts of Justice and
Human Rights have done. It could even go further and conduct joint
investigations and trials with national authorities. The ICC Appeals Chamber
could also follow the example of the European Courts and adopt a
"minimalist" attitude when reviewing hybrid court decisions, particularly those
decisions that are still subject to sustained debate in local courts, legislatures,
and communities. A "minimalist" Appeals Chamber would say "no more than
necessary to justify an outcome" and "leav[e] as much as possible undecided,"
so as to leave "issues open for democratic deliberation."'76
172 Slaughter & Heifer, supra note 109, at 312, 316-17.
173 Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408 (1960-1961). In that respect, the ECHR is
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Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 437, 497 (1998) ("The
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4(1998).
176 Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (1996).
32 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
As the examples of the European Courts suggest, enforcing
international law in partnership and deliberation with national institutions is
likely to be more lasting. A burgeoning literature on transgovernmental
networks also emphasizes the potential of forming transnational coalitions to
assist local elites and institutions in implementing international law.'" The
price for this effectiveness, however, is that it takes a longer time. As Anne-
Marie Slaughter and Laurence Helfer observe, "finding and recruiting
domestic institutions as partners is likely to be a slow and sticky process."'78
Patience may be too much to ask when violations of fundamental human rights
remain unpunished. On the other hand, rushing the process may only
undermine progress toward better human rights enforcement, as the evidence
from the Caribbean states suggests.'78 In the end, international law's best hope
may be a gradual but broad diffusion of its norms through national
governments and elites.'80
As Part II elaborated, the bottom-up development of international law
through mixed courts would not only be more sustainable, but also more
respectful of the diversity of opinion on international criminal law that exists in
states around the world. By consciously encouraging such development of the
law from the ground up, the ICC-as-mixed-court can promote "social
deliberation, learning, compromise, and moral evolution over time."'8'
The court will therefore mark its greatest achievement when it captures
the minds of local judges, prosecutors, and investigators who will work on the
ground to promote international human rights and humanitarian law. Perhaps
in recognition of this fact, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia has itself recently begun rethinking its isolation from courts in the
former Yugoslavia. Last year, its former President Judge Jorda indicated an
interest in referring some cases from the ICTY to local courts, observing: "[I]t
is essential to work with the existing organs and judicial institutions-if only
by assisting them-since they constitute essential reference points for all
citizens ... [t]he idea being upheld is that whereby justice must be brought
steadily closer to the people."'8 2 Judge Jorda is one of the judges appointed to
177 See generally Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 204 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Governing]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The
Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183 [hereinafter Slaughter, The Real New
World Order].
178 Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 109, at 335; see also Moravcsik, supra note 168, at 159 ("The
most effective elements of the European human rights system are thus also the subtlest. This delicate
process of legal harmonization proceeds slowly.").
179 See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
180 Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 42-44 (1974); Slaughter, Governing, supra note 177, at 179-81.
181 Sunstein, supra note 176, at 33.
182 Press Release, ICTY, JDH/P.I.S./690-e, Address by His Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda,
President of the ICTY, to the United Nations Security Council (July 26, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p690-e.htm; see also Michael Bohlander, Last Exit Bosnia-
Transferring War Crimes Prosecution from the International Tribunal to Domestic Courts, 14 CRIM.
L.F. 59, 62-64, 66 (2003); Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Up, Down and Across: The ICTY's Place in the
International Legal Order, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1037, 1042 (2003).
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the ICC--one can hope that he will bring this insight along with him to the
new court.
B. Where States Are Willing but Unable To Prosecute: The ICC as a
Supporting Institution for National Courts
How could the ICC engage national authorities in the enforcement of
international criminal law? This Section highlights several possibilities for
fruitful interaction between the ICC and national actors. Under the current
admissibility structure, the ICC can take up a case where it determines that a
national judicial system has substantially collapsed. 3 The question in such
instances is purely one of capacity and not of willingness to prosecute.
Consequently, where significant benefits to local prosecutions exist, the ICC
should work to rebuild the capacities of the ailing national judicial system. In
cases where the local government is simply unable to prosecute war crimes by
itself, the ICC should not take cases to The Hague, but instead work with the
government to enforce international criminal law locally.
1. Assisting Local Investigations and Prosecutions
War crimes prosecutions usually take place after an extremely divisive
and disruptive conflict. As a result, many national judicial systems lack the
wherewithal to conduct adequate proceedings. With outside help, however,
many countries in transition could regain the capacity to prosecute war crimes
fairly and effectively. Practitioners in countries in transition have suggested
that the ICC could help greatly in these situations by providing logistical
support and sharing its expertise."4
At the most basic level, the court could help by training local judges,
investigators, and prosecutors. It could also offer to share its expertise in
matters ranging from investigation techniques, to international law research, to
victim protection issues.8 It would be well beyond the court's mandate to
provide basic material resources that state judiciaries might lack, but the
collaboration of ICC officials with local authorities is likely to raise awareness
of these needs among international donors. And by offering its resources and
expertise during joint investigations with local authorities, the ICC could also
relieve some of the financial pressure on domestic judicial and investigative
offices. '86
With the consent of the national government, the ICC could provide
more than logistical support and training to domestic authorities. Its officers
could perform joint investigations and prosecutions on the ground. Senator
Arlen Specter put forth such a proposal in the early stages of discussions about
a permanent international criminal court. Senator Specter proposed that the
183 ICC Statute art. 17.
184 Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and
National Prosecutions, A View From Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 201, 201-03 (2000).
15 Id. at 240-44; Tolbert, supra note 160, at 16.
186 Concannon, Jr., supra note 184, at 232.
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international community create a standing body-an international or regional
tribunal, which would have investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial staff, but
which would be used mainly to support domestic authorities in their efforts to
prosecute transnational crimes. Countries would have the option of
prosecuting a case on their own, utilizing the investigative and legal expertise
of the standing international court while retaining control over cases, or fully
transferring a case to the international court.'87 The court's main function
would be to promote local prosecutions; it would not serve as "a substitute for
or a distraction from domestic prosecution, but [as] an additional means and
facilitator for either domestic or international prosecution of international
crimes.,188
The ICC Statute can accommodate this supporting and collaborative
role for the court's investigators and prosecutors. Upon the request by a
member state, the ICC can cooperate with that state's authorities in
investigating offenses within the jurisdiction of the court, or even offenses that
constitute "a serious crime under the national law of the requesting State."'88
Under certain conditions, the court may also provide assistance to states that
are not parties to the Rome Statute.9 o The types of cooperation and assistance
explicitly authorized by the Statute include the transmission of evidence
obtained by the court and the questioning of persons detained by the order of
the court.'
This cooperation can even occur on the territory of the state where the
crime was committed. The Statute allows the court to "exercise its functions
and powers. ... on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement,
on the territory of any other State.' 8 2 Although Article 42 provides that a
member of the Office of the Prosecutor "shall not seek or act on instructions
from any external source,""' a properly drafted cooperation agreement could
ensure that the ICC investigators and prosecutors are acting upon instructions
of their Hague supervisors, even as they collaborate with local officers. A
statutory amendment, explicitly authorizing ICC officials to provide assistance
to local authorities, could also encourage the ICC to train local officials in
investigative techniques and victims' issues.
The importance of such cooperation arrangements is recognized in a
recent informal paper commissioned by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor
("OTP"), which recommended that the ICC provide information, evidence,
technical expertise, and training to national authorities.'9" By engaging local
authorities, perhaps going as far as to conduct joint investigations, the ICC
187 136 CONG. REc. 14,365, 14,367 (1990).
188 Id.
189 ICC Statute art. 93(10)(a).
190 Id. art. 93(10)(c).
191 Id. art. 93(10)(b).
192 Id. art. 4(2).
193 Id. art. 42.
194International Criminal Court-Office of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper: The Principle
of Complementarity in Practice 5-6 (2003) (recommending that the ICC consider providing
information, evidence, technical expertise, and training to national authorities), at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
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would increase the likelihood of effective prosecutions, even where the local
criminal justice system is not fully capable of conducting such prosecutions on
its own.' 9 Effective prosecutions, in turn, would increase public respect for the
legal system and thus promote the rule of law over the long run. Finally, the
collaboration between national and international investigators and prosecutors
has the potential to spur a productive dialogue about the substance and
procedure of prosecutions for international crimes.
2. The ICC as a Circuit Rider
Neither Senator Specter's proposal nor the OTP report envisioned the
possibility of joint judicial proceedings sponsored by the International
Criminal Court. Under Specter's proposal, national judges would preside over
national trials, and international judges would preside over the trials referred to
the international tribunal by national authorities. Yet the logic of Specter's
plan and the OTP report applies to judicial, not merely investigative and
prosecutorial, collaboration. During the drafting of the ICC Statute, some
delegates put forth just such a model, under which the ICC would serve as a
"traveling court, ''96 conducting both investigations and proceedings at the
location where crimes were committed.'97 In effect, ICC judges would serve on
ad hoc, mixed courts, akin to the ones currently used in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and Kosovo. Importantly, this model was proposed as a cost-saving
198
measure.
The popularity of mixed courts over the last several years suggests that
having ICC prosecutors and judges conduct trials on the ground, with the
cooperation of local authorities, might be a viable option where domestic
authorities are willing but unable to prosecute war crimes. Countries in
transition themselves have favored mixed courts. When the Rwandan
government first contemplated prosecuting war crimes committed on its
territory and asked for international aid, "it hoped that international assistance
would take the form of joint trials and investigations, or at least international
proceedings within Rwanda."' 9 The Sierra Leonean government, 2o Cambodian
government,0 1 and East Timorese lawyers0 2 also asked the international
195 Id.
196 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Financing, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 315, 321
(citing Discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/L.2, at para. 248 (1995)).
197 Id. at 321.
198 Id.
199 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 393.
200 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc S/2000/915 (2000), at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/661/77/PDF/N0066177.pdfOpenElement (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005); Micaela Frulli, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, It EUR. J. INT'L L. 857,
858 (2000).
201 Letter from Norodom Ranariddh, First Prime Minister of Cambodia, and Hun Sen, Second
Prime Minister of Cambodia, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General (June 21, 1997), in U.N. Doc.
A/51/930 (June 24, 1997).
202 The East Timorese legal community was split on this issue. Although some international and
East Timorese NGOs insisted on an international tribunal for East Timor, the UN Transitional
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community to set up mixed courts on their territory. The Bush
administration, too, has favored mixed courts as a superior alternative to the
ICC °4 and was considering a similar model for a court to try Iraqi officials for
crimes against humanity. 5 Finally, the UN itself has lent its support to hybrid
courts: With the consent and assistance of local authorities, the UN established
such courts in Kosovo,2  East Timor,2 7 and Sierra Leone,2 °8 and is negotiating a
similar arrangement with the Cambodian and Guatemalan governments. °4
Admittedly, it is too early to make a comprehensive assessment of the
performance of these mixed courts. Yet given their popularity and their
promise as a model for the bottom-up enforcement of international criminal
law, it is useful to consider their strengths and weaknesses.
a. Structure and Functions of Mixed Courts
Mixed tribunals operate in the country where the atrocities took place,
but rely on the combined expertise of local and international judges,
prosecutors, and investigators. In the Sierra Leonean and East Timorese
hybrid courts, two-thirds of the judges are UN-appointed, and the remaining
third is local or at least appointed by the national government."' The Kosovo
courts include a majority of local judges sitting together with judges appointed
by the UN.211 After years of difficult negotiations concerning its composition,
the proposed court for Cambodia would include panels with a majority of
Cambodian judges and a prosecutor's office headed by one Cambodian- and
Administration for East Timor, with the support of other East Timorese lawyers, decided on a mixed-
court model largely based on the proposed court for Cambodia.
203 A recent survey of Bosnian judges also concludes that mixed courts involving local jurists
and taking place close to where the crimes were committed would be well-received by the local legal
community. JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 131, at 48-50.
204 E.g., Pierre-Richard Prosper, Justice Without Borders: The International Criminal Court, 17
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 85, 89 (2003).
205 Heidi Kingstone, Out of the Killing Fields, JERUSALEM REP., June 30, 2003, at 24; Michelle
Mittelstadt, Options for Hussein Trial Run Gamut; If He's Caught, He Could Face Military Tribunals,
Courts or Ad Hoc Panels, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 30, 2003, at 19A.
206 The project for a mixed War Crimes Court in Kosovo was never implemented, but pursuant
to a regulation of the UN Mission in Kosovo, an international judge sits alongside local judges in war
crimes cases in regular domestic courts.
207 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Reg. No. 2000/15 (June 6, 2000),
at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg0015E.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
208 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
209 Mydans, supra note 5, at 6; U.N. Help for Crime in Guatemala, supra note 5, at A28.
210 Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International
Justice, 12 CRiM. L.F. 185, 204-05, 234 (2001).
211 Id.
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one UN-appointed lawyer.22 The Bosnian mixed court is also likely to include
a minority of international judges.23
The international community is heavily involved in both the creation
and financing of mixed tribunals and therefore plays a significant role in
devising the legal standards and procedures used by those tribunals. At the
same time, mixed courts are designed to suit the needs of the host country and
to involve the local population in the proceedings.
One way in which hybrid courts address local needs is that their
subject matter jurisdiction incorporates both domestic and international
criminal law.2 ' The inclusion of domestic law allows these courts to address
crimes that were pervasive during a particular conflict, but are not necessarily
covered by international criminal law. For instance, the statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone criminalizes abuses of girls under fourteen and the
abduction and forced recruitment of children."5 These provisions reflect the
nature of the atrocities committed in Sierra Leone, where thousands of children
were abducted and forced to fight in the civil war, or became victims of rape
and physical abuse."6 Furthermore, unlike international criminal tribunals,
which have personal jurisdiction only over adults, the Special Court can try
individuals who were fifteen or older at the time they allegedly committed the
crime.27 Although international experts wanted to limit the jurisdiction of the
Special Court to adults, the Sierra Leonean government maintained that this
would hurt the legitimacy of the court. Sierra Leoneans, the government
argued, demanded that child soldiers, who were among the most brutal
perpetrators of war crimes, be held accountable.28  While the government
prevailed on that point, in deference to international demands, the Statute
provides for special remedies and procedures in trials of juvenile offenders.
The Statute also emphasizes the desirability of rehabilitating and reintegrating
juveniles into society.2"9 The deliberations between international human rights
organizations and the Sierra Leonean government thus reflect a "constructive,
pluralistic" approach to the problem of child soldiers and to international
criminal law enforcement more generally.22
212 Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Agenda
Item 109(b), at 7, U.N. Doc. A/57/769 (2003). To avoid the potential deadlock from having co-
prosecutors, the statute for the Cambodian mixed court provides that, in the case of disagreement
between the two prosecutors, the prosecution would continue, except that one of the prosecutors could
bring the case for review by the pretrial Chamber within thirty days. Unless a supermajority of the
pretrial Chamber (four out of five judges) agrees that no basis for the prosecution exists, the
prosecution would continue. Linton, supra note 210, at 192.
213 Bohlander, supra note 182, at 70-71.
214 E.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as amended Jan. 16, 2002, arts. 1-5,
available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/Statute.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
215 Id. arts. 4(c), 5(a),
216 Jennifer L. Poole, Post-Conflict Justice in Sierra Leone, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra
note 117, at 563, 583.
217 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 215, art. 7.
218 Poole, supra note 216, at 583.
219 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 215, art. 7. The prosecutor of the
Special Court, David Crane, has also committed not to prosecute child soldiers, but instead to focus on
the perpetrators with the greatest responsibility for the atrocities-who are all adults.
220 See Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber
in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 167, 168 (2001).
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Like the Special Court in Sierra Leone, both the Serious Crimes Unit
in East Timor and the proposed Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia have
subject matter jurisdiction over international as well as domestic crimes. In
Cambodia, among the domestic crimes included are homicide, torture, and
religious persecution, for which the statute of limitations is extended for
twenty years.2 2 ' The proposed statute also provides for the prosecution of
violations of The Hague Cultural Property Convention, in reflection of the
pervasive attacks on Cambodia's cultural heritage during the rule of the Khmer
Rouge.2 In East Timor, the Serious Crimes Unit can prosecute war crimes and
crimes against humanity, as well as murders, sexual crimes, and arson attacks
committed during the 1999 referendum on the independence of the island
nation.223
In addition to incorporating local laws in their proceedings, mixed
courts are also better able than international tribunals to engage the local
population in their proceedings .2 2  Thus, officials from Sierra Leone's Special
Court have been visiting local schools and government agencies and have
engineered publicity campaigns to educate local communities about the court's
work.225 They have further raised awareness about the court by traveling
around the country to collect evidence. 6 The local media have also covered
the proceedings of domestically based courts more extensively than those of
international tribunals. More extended coverage raises public awareness of the
tribunals and stimulates a dialogue about the process of reckoning with the
past.
Because of their location, mixed courts also manage better to
coordinate their functions with other domestic institutions dealing with human
rights abuses, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions set up in
Sierra Leone and East Timor.2 1  Such coordination prevents overlap and
encourages a more efficient division of institutional responsibilities for dealing
with the past. For example, in East Timor, the Truth Commission serves
reconciliation efforts by holding public hearings to investigate the truth about
221 Linton, supra note 210, at 193.
222 Id. at 196.
221 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, supra note 207, §§ 3, 8, 9; Jill
Jolliffe, A Year To Remember, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 20, 2003, at A3.
224 Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1199 (2000); Tolbert, supra note 160, at 12-17 (citing as
one of the deficiencies of the ICTY its inability to educate the public in the former Yugoslavia about
the goals and work of the international tribunal).
225 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE "LEGACY" OF THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 17 (2003).
226 Charles Cobb, Jr., Sierra Leone's Special Court: Will It Hinder or Help?, ALLAFRICA.COM,
Nov. 21, 2002, at 2, at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200211210289.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2003). The Tribunal has engaged in a variety of other outreach efforts, including a charity
soccer game to benefit amputee victims of the civil war. See Sierra Leone Special Court To Sponsor
Charity Football Match To Benefit Amputees, AFRICA NEWS, Mar. 5, 2004, LEXIS, News & Business
Library, Africa News File.
227 Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, supra
note 224, at 51-53 (describing the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the
Human Rights Commission, and a "data-gathering project" to supplement the Special Court); Lisa
Clausen, Slow Road to Justice, TIME, Mar 24, 2003, at 48 (describing perceptions of the Truth
Commission as the institution dealing with low-level criminals and the Serious Crimes Unit as the
court charged with handling high officials).
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the conflict there, and by initiating "community reconciliation procedures"
("CRP") at the regional level. At regional CRP hearings, lower-level criminals
(who committed incidental acts of violence or theft, but not a serious criminal
offence within the jurisdiction of the Serious Crimes Unit) can testify, ask their
victims and the community for forgiveness, and offer to make reparations or
perform community service."8 In return, they are absolved from criminal
responsibility for these crimes and reintegrated into the community. At the
same time, the Serious Crimes Unit serves retribution and deterrence functions
by indicting higher-level officials.229 This division of labor both conserves
scarce resources and helps with national reconciliation.
In Sierra Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission handles
most juvenile offenders-youth who were often abducted and forced to
perform horrible crimes.23 By contrast, the Special Court focuses on higher-
ups and particularly brutal perpetrators. This approach encourages not only a
fair and proportionate treatment of different offenders, but also the
reintegration of combatants into society, which is essential to rebuilding peace
and stability in the country.23'
Mixed courts have also generally been more effective than
international tribunals in processing cases. In less than three years, in spite of
delays, language problems, and inexperienced lawyers impeding its work, the
Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor has obtained thirty-two convictions and
issued fifty-eight indictments involving 240 people.3 2 By contrast, in its first
eight years, the ICTY issued nineteen judgments,2 33 while the ICTR had issued
only eight judgments in its first six years.2 " These figures underscore the
efficiency of mixed courts, particularly given the significantly larger budgets
of the international tribunals.233
228 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, On the Establishment of a
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor §§ 27, 32 (2001), reprinted in
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 117, at 546, 558-59.
229 See Clausen, supra note 227, at 48.
230 Poole, supra note 216, at 590.
231 See id. at 591.
232 Clausen, supra note 227, at 48.
233 United Nations, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, Oct. 17, 2003, at
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
234 ICTR, The Tribunal at a Glance, at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheets/l.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005).
235 While the ICTR's and ICTY's budgets have averaged about $75 million per year, the budget
of the whole UN mission in East Timor, of which the funds for the Special Court are but a fraction,
comes to $28 million a year. See Linton, supra note 210, at 205 n.69 (citing the serious lack of
resources at the East Timor mixed courts); Elizabeth Neuffer, Lagging Tribunal Is Called a Threat to
a Viable East Timor; Slaughter Suspects Elude UN's Reach, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2001, at A6
(citing the budget of the UN mission). Similarly, the proposed mixed court in Bosnia, which is to
replace the ICTY around 2008, will have an estimated budget of $6 million to $11 million.
Bohlander, supra note 182, at 84. The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers are expected to require
$57 million over three years. Amy Kazmin, Cambodia in Agreement on UN Genocide Tribunal Plan,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2004, at 10.
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b. Overcoming the Challenges of Mixed Courts
A review of the advantages of mixed courts may suggest that they
provide a better alternative to the ICC. Yet mixed courts created on an ad hoc
basis face various challenges that could be addressed most effectively by
involving the ICC on a regular basis in their operation.
For example, the creation of mixed courts on an ad hoc basis entails
substantial start-up costs. One way to reduce these costs and to ensure a more
consistent commitment to mixed-court prosecutions would be to involve a
repeat player, such as the ICC, in their operations. If ICC judges and
prosecutors served regularly on ICC-backed mixed courts, their experience
could significantly increase the quality and efficiency of mixed court
prosecutions.
The experience of the Sierra Leone and East Timor tribunals suggests
that ad hoc courts may have difficulty obtaining the cooperation of foreign
authorities in the investigation of international crimes. These problems are
especially likely to arise in the prosecutions of foreign nationals. Both the
Sierra Leone and East Timor tribunals have been unable to obtain custody over
key suspects who are foreign nationals and are being protected by their own
governments or have been granted exile by a third state.236 To the extent that
the ICC is better able to solicit cooperation from third states-for example,
because those states are themselves members of the court23-ICC-backed
hybrid courts would be more successful in enforcing international criminal law
than their predecessors in East Timor and Sierra Leone.
Mixed courts might also be seen as a less coherent means of
developing international criminal law. The more a hybrid court relies on
domestic procedures and expertise in deciding a war crimes case, the more
likely it is that its decision will differ from those of other hybrid courts in
interpreting humanitarian law. As argued earlier, such variation should not be
a cause for alarm. Variation is an important element of local legitimacy and a
source of information and innovation in international criminal law. At the
same time, a regime of mixed courts that is connected to the ICC rather than
standing alone, would help stabilize the most fundamental international norms.
236 The Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL") has not been able to obtain custody over
Charles Taylor, one of its key suspects and a Liberian national. Taylor was granted exile by the
Nigerian government as part of a peace deal for Liberia. Nigeria refuses to surrender Taylor to the
SCSL unless it is explicitly requested to do so by Liberia. Chris Melville, Liberian Assembly Protects
Ousted President from Extradition to War Crimes Court, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, July 09, 2004,
LEXIS, News & Business Library, World Markets Analysis File. Similarly, Indonesia has refused to
either prosecute or extradite to the Special Crimes Unit in East Timor some of its military officials
accused of committing human rights violations in East Timor. This lack of cooperation has interfered
with the work of the East Timor mixed court and has led some human rights organizations to call for
the establishment of an "international commission of experts." Amnesty Says UN Dragging Its Feet in
Seeking Justice for East Timor, CHANNEL NEWSASIA, Apr. 14, 2004, LEXIS, News & Business
Library, Channel NewsAsia File; Wahyoe Boediwardhana, Dili Undecided on 'Expert Commission',
JAKARTA POST, Aug. 16, 2004, available at 2004 WL 77631251.
237 For a review of the potential enforcement setbacks facing the ICC itself, see discussion supra
Part I.
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Consistent with this goal, the treaties setting up ICC-backed hybrid
courts could entrust the ICC Appeals Chamber (which could be fully
international, or mixed, with ICC judges in the majority) with resolving
unwarranted jurisprudential inconsistencies. The Appeals Chamber could
demarcate the boundaries between fundamental international law norms, from
which deviation is unacceptable, and issues on which deliberation and diversity
among the hybrid courts is welcome. The Appeals Chamber ought to operate
on the presumption that it should leave undecided those questions of factual
and moral uncertainty that are still being contested and worked out in more
representative institutions (e.g., hybrid courts or national courts and
legislatures).238 In this way, an ICC-backed mixed court could strike the
appropriate balance between legal coherence and respect for diversity and
autonomy.
Although involving the ICC would minimize many of the problems
faced by the existing hybrid courts, many practical and legal difficulties would
persist even in ICC-backed mixed tribunals. Some of these difficulties are
inherent in international prosecutions more generally. Several others,
distinctive to mixed courts, could be resolved through careful institutional
design. The remaining drawbacks of mixed courts are not decisive and are
outweighed by the benefits of mixed-court prosecutions.
A common problem encountered in both international and mixed-court
prosecutions is that differences in legal practices around the world often cause
disagreements among judicial officials and delays in the administration of
justice.239 While this problem is also present in international tribunals, it is
accentuated in mixed tribunals. First, mixed tribunals operate in a postconflict
environment, where the basic infrastructure is often in shambles, which
exacerbates delays in the administration of justice. Second, mixed courts rely
more extensively on local laws and procedures, narrowing the common ground
of legal expertise between national and international judges and thus causing
longer deliberations about cases.
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Delays occasioned by a frail infrastructure, however, will always
plague enforcement in countries emerging from a violent conflict, whether they
investigate on their own, in the course of a mixed proceeding, or in response to
an ICC request. ICC investigators who take part in mixed proceedings will
directly gather evidence on the ground, instead of having to go through the
notoriously slow "diplomatic channels" for requesting cooperation.24 ' By
establishing a working relationship with local officials, they will also be less
likely to be confronted by the suspicion and resistance that often greets
requests for cooperation from foreign tribunals.
238 Sunstein, supra note 176, at 30-33. Examples of such questions would be procedural and
sentencing practices on which no strong international consensus exists: the scope of the right to
confrontation of witnesses, the reliance on trials in absentia, the use of plea bargaining, or the use of
the death penalty. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. In resolving these questions, the ICC
Appeals Chamber could look to European supranational courts and their doctrines of margin of
appreciation and subsidiarity, or to American federal court decisions on habeas corpus and on the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
239 Linton, supra note 210, at 200.
240 Id.
241 ICC Statute art. 87(1).
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Another challenge of mixed courts is the potential for bias or
unfairness. Even with the presence of international officials on the ground,
host governments could attempt to manipulate the process by putting pressure
on local judges and prosecutors.12 This was one of the major concerns of the
Group of Experts evaluating the feasibility of holding domestic trials in
Cambodia of the former Khmer Rouge leaders (some of whom had struck
political bargains with the current regime of Hun Sen and were allegedly
promised immunity). The Group concluded that only an ad hoc UN tribunal
held outside of Cambodia would meet international standards of justice.4
Because Cambodian authorities "still lack[ed] a culture of respect for an
impartial criminal justice system," neither a domestic nor a mixed tribunal
would be effective and free from political manipulation. 2"
These concerns have largely been addressed by the voting rules and
composition of the mixed courts in East Timor and Sierra Leone and the
chambers proposed for Cambodia. In East Timor and Sierra Leone, two-thirds
of the judges are international, so every decision requires the consent of at least
one international judge. This arrangement dramatically reduces the effect of
any political pressure that the local government may put on local judges. In
Cambodia, where the majority of judges would be local, a supermajority vote
would be required for a decision of guilt or innocence, so that an international
judge would always have to consent to an acquittal or conviction. Many
important decisions, however, would be decided by a majority rule, causing
concern for some commentators. ' To address those concerns, future ICC-
sponsored mixed courts could opt for a supermajority vote on most major
decisions or follow the Sierra Leonean and East Timorese model to include a
majority of international judges on each panel. Either solution would present a
good balance between concerns for fairness and impartiality on the one hand,
and local participation and diversity on the bench on the other. 246
Designing the structure and voting rules of a mixed tribunal would be
even more difficult in situations where the tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes
arising from a multiethnic or multinational conflict. Mixed tribunals would
have to balance the authority not only of local and international judges, but
also of local judges from different ethnicities or nationalities. To some extent,
242 As one commentator on legal reform observed:
The technical aspect of providing training and materials to judiciaries is
straightforward, and it is this idea that international efforts focus on. More elusive is
the task of restoring to the judiciary the two vital traits it requires to function under the
rule of law: independence and impartiality. The greatest obstacle to judicial reform in
many countries is eliminating the influence of the executive branch of government.
RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION 65 (2002).
243 Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
948, 951 (1999).
244 Id.
245 Linton, supra note 210, at 199 (noting with concern that aside from guilt and innocence, all
other decisions will be made on the basis of a majority vote).
24 The voting rule could vary according to the political context within which mixed courts are
established. Where international assistance is needed mainly to enhance local material resources, a
majority of local judges and a mere majority voting rule will suffice. Where the international
community has serious concerns about fairness and bias, the mixed courts could operate either under a
supermajority voting rule (which brings with it the costs of deadlock and delay) or a majority of
international judges (which carries fewer of the benefits of local participation).
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this model has already bccn tried with some success in Kosovo, where both
Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Serb judges have sat on war crimes trials
alongside their international counterparts. 7 It is also the proposed framework
for the mixed court successor to the ICTY in Bosnia, which will try the
remaining cases of war crimes once the ICTY completes its work. The
tribunal would consist of five judges-one Bosnian Muslim, one Bosnian Serb,
one Bosnian Croat, and two international judges."8 This composition would
ensure a fair representation of all groups directly affected by the court's
decisions.
Regardless of the courts' compositions and voting structures,
disagreements between local and international judges are bound to arise. The
debates between international and local lawyers over the use of the death
penalty in Iraq and the prosecution of juvenile soldiers in Sierra Leone point to
some potential areas of contention. Deliberation will inevitably raise the short-
term costs of war crimes trials by bringing conflict to the surface and drawing
out the decisionmaking process. As Section II.B discussed, however, these
costs are outweighed by the benefits: Deliberation between national and
international communities is a more legitimate means of addressing
contentious legal issues than would be a decision by a self-contained
international court that could simply ignore the preferences of the relevant
local populations. In addition, deliberation is more likely to produce informed
decisions and to encourage a healthy evolution of national and international
criminal law over time.
Undoubtedly, ICC-backed mixed courts would face other, as-yet-
unanticipated practical challenges depending on the legal and political context
in which the courts are set up. In some contexts, a mixed court might be
perceived by the local population as undue foreign interference in domestic
transitional justice efforts." 9 This problem is especially likely to arise where
an unrepresentative government has invited ICC participation in a hybrid
tribunal. There are no clear answers on how these context-sensitive problems
might be resolved. What is clear, however, is that an ICC working
independently in The Hague would not present a better alternative in these
situations. Finally, this Article does not attempt to resolve every practical or
political problem that might arise in the establishment and operation of ICC-
backed mixed courts. Rather, it focuses on laying out guiding principles for
solving such problems and on opening up a conversation about the possibility
of a more decentralized approach to international criminal law.
247 The success of the Kosovo mixed courts was limited in that respect, however. In the initial
stages of the court's operation, many Serbian judges resigned from the bench under pressure from
Belgrade. Dickinson, supra note 77, at 302.
248 Bohlander, supra note 182, at 70-71.
249 See Linton, supra note 210, at 214 (noting that some East Timorese actors involved in setting
up mixed courts complained about the dominance of international actors in the process); Beth
Dougherty, Victims' Justice, Victors'Justice: Iraq's Flawed Tribunal, 9 MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 61, 65
(2004) (quoting Iraqi Justice Minister Abdul Rahman al-Chalabi as saying that involving foreign
judges in a mixed war crimes court "will undermine [Iraqi] sovereignty and would undercut the value
of the Iraqi judiciary").
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c. Statutory Basis for ICC Participation in Mixed Courts
The ICC was not intended to serve as a mixed court, and for it to
perform that function fully and effectively, amendments to the Statute might be
necessary. Some legal basis for the ICC to serve as a roving mixed court in
different countries does exist, however. As the previous Section discussed,
investigators and prosecutors are authorized to cooperate with local authorities
in the territory of the affected countries. The Statute also provides that,
although the seat of the court will generally be in The Hague, the "Court may
sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable ....,250 There are no
provisions for including local judges in the court's deliberations, but the
presidency of the court can propose an increase in the number of judges,
including judges who do not serve on a full-time basis.25" '
Article 21 of the Statute, which governs applicable law, also provides
that the court may rely in its decisions "on the national law of States that would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime. 252 Under the Statute, however,
national law comes last in the hierarchy of legal sources and is to be
considered only when other sources have proven ambiguous or useless.
Therefore, some amendments would have to be made if national laws were to
be used alongside international laws when the ICC serves as a mixed court."3
Finally, a general provision on the trigger of mixed-court jurisdiction would be
necessary. It would allow the formation of joint investigations or mixed
proceedings, with state consent, where states are unable but willing to
prosecute.25 .
In the short term at least, the ICC could sign a treaty with the
concerned national government every time it engages in a mixed court on the
territory where the crimes were committed. Such a treaty arrangement would
be consistent with Article 4(2) of the Statute, which allows the court to
"exercise its functions and powers ... on the territory of any State Party and,
by special agreement, on the territory of any other State." The ICC-backed
mixed court could then be treated as a local prosecution under the ICC's
complementarity regime. If treated as a local court, the mixed court would
also be free to incorporate a combination of international and domestic
procedural and substantive law into its work.
250 ICC Statute art. 4(2).
251 Id. arts. 36(2)(a) & 35(3). The Assembly of States Parties would have to vote on the
proposal, and a two-thirds majority is necessary to approve it. Id. art. 36(2)(b).
252 Id. art. 21(l)(c).
253 The Statute may also need to provide interpretive guidelines or rules on resolving potential
conflicts between national and international laws. Where international law concerns fundamental, or
peremptory norms, it will automatically trump national laws (the core prohibitions on genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes and fundamental principles of due process likely embody
such peremptory norms). But where there are gaps or ambiguities in international law (for example,
with respect to appropriate punishments and certain aspects of mens rea) or where international law
imposes standards, but not rules (for example, with respect to certain procedural protections), mixed
courts should give greater deference to national laws and practices. One model for balancing
international norms with deference to national practices is the doctrine of "margin of appreciation"
developed by the European Court of Human Rights. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
254 The ICC Statute prohibits amendments in the first seven years of the Statute's entry into
force, however. ICC Statute art. 121.
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C. Where States Are Unwilling To Prosecute Their Nationals: A Mixed
Court in The Hague
In many cases of postconflict justice, national governments might be
unwilling to prosecute international crimes themselves and also refuse to allow
the ICC to join in on prosecutions and trials. Even in the face of such
reluctance, the court might obtain custody of suspects with the help of other
nations or international peacekeeping forces. In those instances, the court
could take up cases in The Hague, as the current admissibility rules provide.
Ensuring that a prosecution takes place is a good first step, but it is not
enough. To obtain the advantages of crosscultural deliberation, the ICC must
go further. It should include in its ranks and deliberations lawyers,
investigators, and judges from the affected area and incorporate or at least
consult relevant national law in its decisions. In effect, the ICC would again
form part of a hybrid tribunal, but due to the reluctance of the national
government to cooperate, that tribunal would be deliberating in The Hague
rather than in the country of original jurisdiction.
Under what conditions could such a scenario develop? First, the
noncooperating government need not be a rogue regime. There are various
reasons why a government that is not associated with the suspects targeted by
the ICC may refuse to go along with all of the court's requests. The
government may be reluctant to prosecute out of concern for its own stability
or the stability of the country. Accordingly, the government may give the
international tribunal access to some evidence so as not to alienate the
international community, but at the same time refuse to collaborate openly
with the ICC lest it alienate forces on the ground. As mentioned earlier, the
only way that the ICC can apprehend suspects in this case would be with the
assistance of third states or of an international peacekeeping force stationed on
the territory of the reluctant state. The former Yugoslavia after the fall of
Milosevic is an apt example. The newly elect President Kostunica cooperated
only minimally with the ICTY and for a long time refused to prosecute or
surrender Slobodan Milosevic and other high-level suspects to the tribunal.
The tribunal therefore had to rely largely on international peacekeeping forces
stationed in the former Yugoslavia to capture suspects for its trials.
When one of the above scenarios transpires, the court would be
justified in taking up the case itself in The Hague. Indeed, that is what the
Rome Statute provides. But as Part II discussed, ICC prosecutions in The
Hague do not reap the benefits of decentralized enforcement of international
criminal law. To gain those benefits, the court ought to incorporate judicial
officials, laws, and procedures from the country of original jurisdiction in its
proceedings. Similar arrangements for including judges of each party's
nationality are common in international arbitration and in the International
Court of Justice."' In common law states, the ancient institution of juries de
255 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 31, available at
http://www.civicwebs.concwvlib/constitutions/unfe-unicoj-statutes.htm#art31 (last visited Jan. 15,
2005); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 37, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
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medietate linguae also provided foreign defendants convicted of international
crimes with a jury partly composed of jurors of the defendant's nationality.5,
As Jos6 Alvarez writes, incorporating judges from the affected area
would have a salutary effect on the proceedings:
The presence of such judges in the courtroom as well as during
deliberations could encourage a more thorough venting of
difficult issues such as those surrounding the credibility of
witnesses (and the role of ethnicity in these determinations),
including through dissenting or separate concurring opinions.
Their presence and views could also generate more nuanced
accounts of what it means to be targeted for violence on the
basis of ethnicity. Such judges would also provide the tribunal
with valuable insight as to [domestic] law.2"
Having national judges from the affected area would increase the range of
viewpoints expressed on the court and would contribute relevant knowledge
about the circumstances of the conflict.
The court could also incorporate the relevant domestic law in its
decisions. Relying on national law to fill in gaps in international criminal law
would add valuable content to the deliberations of the tribunal. It has the
potential to increase the diversity of points considered in a decision. It is also
more likely to be palatable to the relevant domestic constituency and therefore
to reduce the hostility of the national government toward the court. For those
reasons, as well as for reasons of fair notice to the defendant, national law
offers a more legitimate interpretive tool than the ICC judges' own moral and
policy considerations. 5 '
The statutory basis for this model would be similar to the one for
mixed courts on the territory of a state of original jurisdiction.59 A major
difference would be that Hague-based mixed courts would not require the
explicit consent of the affected state. Whenever possible, however, these
courts should sign agreements with the state of original jurisdiction concerning
the status and functions of the local judges and prosecutors who would serve in
The Hague proceedings.
256 Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de Medietate
Linguae: A History anda Proposalfor Change, 74 B.U. L. REv. 777, 781-83 (1994).
257 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 451.
258 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22-A, 49 (ICTY Oct. 7, 1997) (judgment)
(Cassese, J., dissenting) (arguing that, for reasons of fair notice, filling gaps in international criminal
law should be done by reference "to the national legislation of the accused, rather than to moral
considerations or policy-oriented principles"), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-adojcas971007e.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2005); cf. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-T, 539 (ICTY Jan. 14, 2000) (judgment) (noting instances in
which the ICTY would rely on national law), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005); 136 CONG.
REc. 14,365, 14,368 (1990) (noting that "the Tribunal [under the proposal put forth by Senator
Specter] will use the substantive law of the transferring state").
259 See supra Section II.B. 1 (c).
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D. Where States Are Unwilling To Prosecute or Surrender Their
Nationals: Public Hearings in The Hague
When the ICC takes up a case in The Hague, it still depends on nation
states and the international community to enforce its orders. In certain
instances, the court will be unable to either gather evidence or obtain the
custody of suspects, and if it opens up investigations, its orders will be publicly
flouted by a rogue regime. Without the presence of a sympathetic
peacekeeping force on the ground, the ICC could not do its work. Consider the
case of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Even if the ICC had already existed and
had jurisdiction over war crimes committed in Iraq, it could not have
prosecuted Hussein and his cronies while they were still in power. It would
not have been able to apprehend key suspects, even if it had managed to gather
important documentary evidence of human rights abuses from Kurd-controlled
territory.
The same problem arises in cases when national authorities declare
themselves willing to prosecute, but then carry out sham investigations and
proceedings. Where the ICC determines that national proceedings were done
in bad faith and were inconsistent with a genuine intent to prosecute, it can
itself conduct another round of investigations and prosecutions, without
violating the rule against double jeopardy inscribed in the ICC Statute.260 The
impugned national governments, however, are not likely to be receptive to ICC
requests for cooperation or joint investigations. So in these cases, too, the ICC
will have great difficulty gathering evidence and arresting suspects.
Instead of engaging in "judicial romanticism" and taking up cases it
cannot complete, the ICC needs to recreate its mandate in such situations.
Where the ICC cannot obtain key evidence or key suspects, the court should
refrain from commencing a prosecution and instead hold quasi-judicial public
hearings on the human rights abuses committed by the uncooperative regime.
Such hearings would provide an open forum for the discussion of serious
abuses and would gather and preserve evidence for future prosecutions.
In the United States, the Supreme Court has long recognized that its
legitimacy is badly damaged when the executive refuses to enforce its orders. '
As a result, the court has crafted techniques through which it can abstain from
deciding a case when its decision is not likely to be enforced. Indeed, some
scholars, notably Alexander Bickel, have urged courts to use these abstention
260 Article 20 of the ICC Statute delineates the balance between the prohibition on double
jeopardy and the principle of complementarity:
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8
shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms
of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
ICC Statute art. 20.
261 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137-40 (1803).
48 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
techniques more often.26 ' In international law, too, the International Court of
Justice has used admissibility determinations to dispose of cases where it
knows its mandates would be ignored.263 A notable technique is the non-liquet
doctrine, which allows the ICJ to abstain where the law is still unsettled. "
Although some might be disturbed by the instrumental nature of these
decisions, they are important not only for the immediate self-preservation of
the court that issues them, but also for the long-term legitimacy of the
institution and thus for the continued enforcement of the law it interprets. As
Steven Ratner observes in the context of international criminal law, "[a]ttempts
to create criminal law and mechanisms that will be ignored result only in
pretended law, not an improvement in human rights enforcement. Judicial
romanticism has serious systemic costs in a global community with sharply
differing notions about the best way to mete out justice to individuals." '265
To avoid falling into the trap of judicial romanticism, the ICC and its
Assembly of States Parties need to reconsider the court's mandate in cases
where a state is unwilling to cooperate with the court and refuses to turn over
evidence and suspects. The court need not give up completely on serving
human rights in such situations. It could simply reform its role to hold public
hearings, collecting and preserving evidence that may in the future be used in
criminal proceedings. The court would not have any direct way to compel
states or individuals to appear before it, and the only direct consequence of its
hearings would be to publicize the evidence collected from volunteer
witnesses.
In some ways, the ICC would be performing a function similar to that
of the UN Human Rights Committee ("UNHRC"), although the latter does not
hold public hearings with live testimony." Under the First Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNHRC can
receive written communications from individuals who seek relief for human
rights violations where domestic remedies are unavailable. Only citizens of
states that have ratified the Optional Protocol can submit complaints to the
Committee. 6 Once the Committee finds a complaint admissible, it asks for
written submissions by both the aggrieved individual and the state party. It
does not take testimony or hear oral arguments. The Committee deliberates in
private about whether the submissions indicate a violation of the Covenant and
262 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 69-70 (1962).
263 Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the
International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399, 406-07 (1997).
264 W. Michael Reisman, International Non-Liquet: Recrudescence and Transformation, 3 INT'L
LAW. 770, 773 (1969) (arguing that, not theoretical gaps in the law, but institutional and pragmatic
considerations explain and justify the decisions that in effect are non-liquets even if the court does not
describe them as such).
265 Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 237,
256 (1998).
266 The factfinding Commission provided for in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention
performs similar functions as well.
267 Press Release, Human Rights Committee Concludes Three-Week Headquarters Session, U.N.
Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. HRICT/494 (Apr. 11, 1997), at
http://www.scienceblog.com/community/older/archives/L/1997/A/un970478.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2005).
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then issues a written decision, which contains a statement of "the views of the
Committee" on the obligation of the State party.268 The views are then
forwarded to the parties and published in the Committee's annual report to the
General Assembly.
269
The lack of oral testimony and hearings in the UNHCR has diminished
the Committee's shaming effect on delinquent states. One observer identifies
"the absence of direct and effective fact-finding" as a "basic weakness in the
system" and blames the ineffectiveness of the Committee on it.2 ° Therefore,
when the ICC holds its hearings, it should not simply receive written
submissions, but invite witnesses to testify publicly about suspected war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The court should then make
findings of fact and open wide its doors to media from around the world, and
especially from the affected country, to cover the proceedings. The coverage
could have a strong shaming effect on the states publicly identified as
uncooperative and unwilling to prosecute, and individuals as suspects."'
The findings of the court would not provide a direct remedy to the
victims. Instead, the hearings' contribution would consist of preserving
evidence for future prosecutions and providing a forum for the victims to air
their grievances. By shaming the uncooperative governments, the proceedings
could also strengthen the hand of opposition forces in the affected countries.
However minimal their direct effect, the hearings would contribute more to the
enforcement of international criminal law than would an empty judicial order
flouted by a rogue regime or inaction by both the ICC and national authorities.
E. Encouraging Statutory Development
By its very existence, the court is bound to have a subtle influence on
the enforcement of international criminal law by promoting statutory
development in countries around the world. Two main factors account for this
influence. First, the ICC Treaty was produced as a result of long negotiations
among delegates from 150 states. Despite the numerous disagreements among
them, 120 states signed on to the final product, indicating at least minimal
268 DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 130, 141-43, 150 (1991).
269 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 5(4), 5(6)
999 U.N.T.S. 302, 303 (1976).
270 Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
369, 437 (Philip Alston ed., 1992), cited in Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 109, at 280 n.17.
271 Such strategies have worked in the International Labor Organization, where the International
Labor Conference's Committee on the Application of Standards has achieved better compliance with
labor rights by singling out a few violators in its annual report to the full conference and thus
mobilizing international public opinion against those violators. Richard B. Bilder & Frederic L.
Kirgis, Bowett's Law of International Institutions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 741, 743 (2002) (book review)
(reviewing PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT'S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
(2001)); see also Phillip R. Trimble, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 46 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 465, 466
(2002) (noting that shaming abusive governments has been one of the most verifiable achievements of
the human rights movement); Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard
Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN
WORLD POLITICS 160, 176-77 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) ("Policy-
makers, like private individuals, are sensitive to the social opprobrium that accompanies violations of
widely accepted behavioral prescriptions. They are, in short, motivated by a desire to avoid the sense
of shame or social disgrace that commonly befalls those who break widely accepted rules.").
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consensus on the statutory framework of the ICC. Second, and more
important, states that have signed and ratified the ICC Treaty have a strong
incentive to pass legislation that criminalizes the core offenses listed in the
Statute. Both under the current ICC Statute and under the proposal articulated
in this Article, the ICC could take away cases from countries that do not have
adequate legislation to prosecute international crimes. As one commentator
has observed, states will be more likely to "pursue domestic prosecutions of
international crimes so as not to trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC over the
case and invite the glare of the eyes of the international community .... 272
Implementing legislation is likely to bring both substantive and
procedural changes in domestic law. Many countries will need to incorporate
into their domestic law prohibitions on crimes against humanity and breaches
of the Geneva Conventions. To avoid a finding of "inability to prosecute,"
some states might also need to amend their criminal procedure laws to meet
minimum fair trial standards under international law. Although some
commentators have suggested that complementarity would require signatory
states "to enact further rights for the accused,.273 in fact, only rudimentary fair
trial guarantees are needed to retain national control over war crimes
prosecutions.'
As Section II.B discussed, the definitions of crimes in the Rome
Statute are still incomplete, but legislatures could use those statutory
definitions as a starting point and build on them in accordance with national
preferences. It is precisely such legislative experimentation that would provide
the basis for the cross-national deliberation and improvement of international
criminal law and procedure.
Whereas the ICC Statute does not require states to pass implementing
legislation on criminalizing offenses listed in the Statute, it does enjoin states
parties to pass laws on the cooperation of national authorities with the ICC.
Countries have to "ensure that there are procedures available under their
national law for all of the forms of cooperation,,1 5 including provisions on
witness protection, financial assistance to the ICC, extradition of nationals, and
recognition of the privileges and immunities of ICC staff.276 As a result, one
can expect states to pass legislation to fulfill their duties-at least on paper-
under the Rome Treaty. There is mounting evidence that states have begun to
do so.
One of the main contributions of the ICC, therefore, will be in
providing, through its statute and rules, a legal framework and language that
national governments can utilize as a template for their own war crimes
statutes. Once states pass implementing legislation, they will be more likely to
use it by bringing war crimes prosecutions. The mere creation of the ICC as a
complementary institution to domestic tribunals thus "dramatically increases
the role of national courts in undertaking trials involving international
272 Ellis, supra note 17, at 223.
273 Id. at 226-27.
274 Proceedings must be conducted "independently or impartially in accordance with the norms
of due process recognized by international law." ICC Statute art. 20.
275 Id. art. 88.
276 Ellis, supra note 17, at 225.
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crime.",2  Indirectly, but effectively, it encourages broader enforcement of
human rights and humanitarian law.
CONCLUSION
International law scholars often assume that the best way to enforce
human rights is by establishing strong international institutions that develop
the law progressively and enforce it independently. Political realists counter
that such institutions are only as useful as powerful states permit them to be
and discourage expansive visions of their mandate. Partisans of the ICC must
come to terms with the realist challenge. They must work to adapt the
institution accordingly, without abandoning hope for the project altogether.
The ICC will undoubtedly be constrained by the state support it commands, but
it can make a difference in the enforcement of human rights law by
encouraging and assisting national authorities in upholding and enforcing
international law.
The ICC and its supporters must decide how the institution will use the
powers it has. If it pursues a path of centralization and insularity, it will
encounter resistance from member states and from the United States, and it
will bring about few of the benefits of reconciliation and institution-building
that its founders envisioned. If the court engages in joint investigations and
trials with national authorities, along the lines set forth in this Article,
enforcement of international criminal law will become more agreeable to the
participating states, who will feel a sense of ownership and control over the
process. In this new, less dominant role, the court might even become
acceptable to the United States, whose support is critical for the court's
effectiveness.
The mixed-court model for the ICC holds out the promise of
strengthening local capacities and contributing to the rebuilding of the rule of
law in nations around the globe. It would move international human rights law
in directions that its true friends must admit are ultimately wise and
necessary-toward a system of law that is better informed, more widely
accepted, and better enforced.
277 Id. at 241.
